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THE HIDDEN COSTS OF HABEAS DELAY
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FALKOFF *

Because habeas petitioners seek a court order for liberty
rather than compensation, judges have a duty to decide
habeas petitions promptly. But increasingly, the federal
courts have fallen behind on their heavy habeas dockets, and
many petitions-some of which are meritorious-remain
undecided for years. First, this Article makes the normative
and historical argument that speed must be, and always has
been, central to the function of habeas. Second, it analyzes
newly compiled Administrative Office of the United States
Courts data on more than 200,000 habeas petitions and
demonstrates empirically for the first time that there is a
widespread and growing problem of delay in the resolution
of habeaspetitions in the federal courts. Third, this Article
offers a specific and concrete remedy for the habeas delay
problem, recommending that the Judicial Conference of the
United States require judges to identify publicly all habeas
petitions that have been pending in their chambers for more
than six months, just as the Civil Justice Reform Act
requires them to do for all other civil motions.
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INTRODUCTION
A prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus from a federal
judge should have his petition decided quickly. The habeas
petitioner, after all, contends that his detention is illegal and
that every day he spends in prison is an incompensable injury.1
Of course, unreasonable delay in any civil matter is an
injustice. 2 Delay costs litigants time and money, and it
undermines public confidence in the administration of our
judicial system. 3 But habeas-in which the petitioner's very
1. See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 202 (1830) (stating that "the great
object" of the writ of habeas corpus "is the liberation of those who may be
imprisoned without sufficient cause").
2. Federal habeas actions are categorized as civil matters, even though they
frequently challenge detentions that are authorized by criminal convictions. See
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 91 n.2 (2006); COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RULES GOVERNING
SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 12 (1976) ("The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent that they are not inconsistent with
these rules, may be applied, when appropriate, to petitions filed under these
rules.").
3. See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., CIVIL CASE
PROCESSING IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A 21ST CENTURY ANALYSIS 1
(2009) [hereinafter IAALS STUDY] ("[F]or the general public, extended cases
epitomize government inefficiency and drive reduced public confidence in the
judicial system."); TERENCE DUNGWORTH & NICHOLAS M. PACE, STATISTICAL
OVERVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, at iii (RAND Corp.
1990) (same). Critiques of the slowness of the courts abound in popular literature.
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liberty is at stake-is a special category of case for which
prompt adjudication is, in a real sense, the raison d'itre for the
cause of action. 4
Increasingly, however, habeas petitions have languished
on the dockets of the federal courts, often for years. 5 This delay
has been most striking in the highly publicized Guantinamo
cases, which have remained on the D.C. district courts' dockets
for nearly a decade. 6 There are, of course, unique explanations
for the slow resolution in the Guantinamo cases-not least
that Congress has twice sought to strip the federal courts of
jurisdiction to hear them. 7 But what is less explicable, and

For example, in his famous soliloquy, Hamlet asks not only why a sane person
would "bear the whips and scorns of time," but also why he would brook "the law's
delay" rather than just dispatch himself with his sword. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
THE TRAGICAL HISTORY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 3, sc. 1, 11.69-71
(Ann Thomson & Neil Taylor eds., Arden Shakespeare Third Series 2006) (160405); see also CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 8 (George Ford & Sylv~re Monod
eds., W.W. Norton & Co. 1977) (1853) (recounting the fictional case of Jarndyce v.
Jarndyce, which "drags its dreary length before the court" for generations).
4. See infra Part I.A.
5. See infra pp. 378-86.
6. The first of the Guantinamo habeas petitions was filed on behalf of four
detainees in February 2002, only about a month after GuantAnamo was opened as
a War on Terror prison. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 471-72 & n.1 (2004)
(noting petitions filed by two British and two Australian detainees). But it was
not until October 2008 that a federal judge first ruled on the merits of a
Guantdnamo habeas petition. See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, 581
F. Supp. 2d 33, 34 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding the detention of seventeen Uighur
nationals illegal).
7. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739
(2006); Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948a (2006). The
Guantdnamo cases have raised threshold questions about the statutory
availability of the writ. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484 (holding federal courts had
jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions filed by Guantdnamo prisoners pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241). GuantAnamo cases have also raised questions about the proper
construction of congressional legislation designed to block the access of "enemy
combatants" to the courts. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 582-83 (2006)
(holding Congress did not intend the Detainee Treatment Act to bar federal courts
from exercising jurisdiction over already pending habeas petitions filed by
Guantinamo prisoners); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795 (2008) (holding
unconstitutional provisions of the Military Commission Act that stripped federal
courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions filed by Guantdnamo prisoners).
Additionally, the Guantdnamo cases raised questions about the scope of the
Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 795.
Nonetheless, the slow pace of the litigation has not gone unnoticed by the
judiciary. In Boumediene, Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority that "the costs
of delay can no longer be borne by those who are held in custody." Id. Two years
earlier, a district court judge refused a government motion to stay proceedings in
a Guantinamo habeas case, stating that, "{ilt is often said that 'justice delayed is
justice denied.' Nothing could be closer to the truth with reference to the
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rarely discussed among scholars, is a pandemic of delay
infecting ordinary habeas litigation throughout the entire
federal judicial system.8
This Article analyzes, for the first time, raw data made
available by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts (Administrative Office) regarding all of the more than
200,000 state-prisoner, non-capital habeas cases that appeared
on the federal courts' dockets from 1996 to 20089 and reaches
some disconcerting conclusions. Key findings include the
following:
* The number of state-prisoner habeas applications that
remain undecided by the federal district courts as of the
end of every fiscal year is large and has increased
annually from 1996 (when there were 9,086 such
petitions) to 2008 (when there were 15,824)-a 74%
increase.10

* The proportion of habeas petitions appearing on the
district courts' dockets that remained undecided for at
least three years increased from 2.7% as of the end of
1996 to 7.8% as of the end of 2008.11
* The proportion of petitions that remained undecided for
at least two years also increased markedly, from only
8.5% of the courts' habeas docket as of the end of 1996 to
18.7% as of the end of 2008.12
* The proportion of state-prisoner habeas applications
that remained undecided for at least one year has
likewise increased annually, from 25.7% of the courts'
docket as of the end of 1996, to 39.4% as of the end of
2008.13
* While some districts have kept disposition times for
habeas applications relatively low, in the ten "slowest"
districts (as measured by mean number of days pending
for habeas applications filed between 1997 and 2006),
fewer than one-third are decided within six months of
filing (29.9%), fewer than half are decided within one
Guantinamo Bay cases." Razak v. Bush, No. 05-1601 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2006)
(refusing a motion to stay proceedings in a habeas case).
8. See infra Part II.B-C.
9. These cases are filed in the district courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(2006).
10. See infra p. 386.
11. See infra pp. 377-78, 385.
12. See infra pp. 379-80, 385.
13. See infra pp. 379-80, 385.
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year of filing (49.2%) and nearly one-fifth require at
least three years before decision (18.4%).14
This data reflect real suffering and injustice. It is a
gruesome fact that some of these petitions become mooted
because, after years of delay, the petitioner has died in prison
before the judge has ruled on his habeas motion. 15 Equally
disturbing are those instances in which a habeas petition, left

undecided on a judge's desk for five or six years or more, is
eventually granted, confirming that an already-unlawful
imprisonment was extended by years due in part to the court's
delay.16 Granted, unlike in the Guantinamo context, where so
far the success rate for habeas petitioners remains well over
50%,17 the likelihood of a state prisoner winning the writ is
quite small--certainly less than one in one hundred.' 8 But even
for the state prisoner who is destined to lose his habeas
petition, inflicting years of uncertainty seems unnecessarily

14. See infra pp. 392-95.
15. See, e.g., Judgment & Order at 1, Olivencia v. Berbarry, No. 99-CV-6415
(E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2003) (dismissing as moot a four-year-old habeas petition
where the petitioner had died two years earlier).
16. In 2003, Senior Judge Jack B. Weinstein volunteered to clear a backlog of
five hundred state-prisoner habeas applications that had remained pending in the
district, often for years. See Order Withdrawing Power of Magistrates over
Habeas Corpus Matters, In re Habeas Corpus Cases, 03-MISC-66 (May 9, 2003)
(listing the five hundred 28 U.S.C. § 2254 cases reassigned to Judge Weinstein).
Judge Weinstein granted the writ in nine cases, including three that had
originally been filed about six years earlier. See Thomas v. Kuhlman, 255 F. Supp.
2d 99 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (petition filed in 1997); Harris v. Artuz, 288 F. Supp. 2d 247
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) (same); Batten v. Greiner, Nos. 97-CV-2378, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16923 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2003) (same). Judge Weinstein also granted the
writ in another case that had been pending for more than four years. See Benn v.
Griener, 275 F. Supp. 2d 371 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (petition filed in 1998). For synopses
of these cases, see JACK B. WEINSTEIN, IN RE HABEAS CORPUS CASES: REPORT ON
500 HABEAS CASES, at 6-14 (2003) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN REPORT].

17. Of the sixty-one habeas applications decided through September 2011 by
the D.C. district courts, the Guantinamo petitioners prevailed in thirty-eight of
them, for a 62% success rate. The D.C. Court of Appeals subsequently reversed
three of the grants and remanded with orders to deny the writ, reversed three of
the grants and remanded with orders to reconsider, and reversed two of the
denials and remanded with orders to reconsider. After taking account of this
appellate action, the petitioners have succeeded in thirty-two of the fifty-seven
petitions to have been decided on the merits, for a 56% success rate. (These
numbers do not take into account petitions that became moot after the
government released a detainee before being ordered to do so by the court.)
18. See NANCY J. KING ET. AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS
LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS 58 & n.109 (Aug. 21, 2007) [hereinafter

KING REPORT] (noting that non-capital state-prisoner habeas cases in her sample
had a success rate of about 1 in 257).
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cruel and suggests a kind of systemic contempt for the plight of
petitioners who seek the court's protection.
It is all too easy to uncover anecdotal evidence of injustices
caused by delay in federal habeas matters. Floyd Batten, for
example, was serving a twenty-year sentence in a New York
prison for the second-degree murder of a furniture store
owner. 19 He learned, from a Freedom of Information Law
Request, 20 that the prosecution in his case had never revealed
to the defense a police report detailing their interviews with
another suspect (an employee of the murder victim who had
previously solicited help in robbing the store). 2 1 Batten filed a
federal habeas petition in April 1997, alleging that the failure
to provide these reports was a violation of the Brady v.
Maryland requirement that the state turn over material
evidence to a defendant. 22 It was not until December 2003,
however, that he received a merits decision granting the writ. 23
Batten's order for a release from state prison did not come until
six years after he first asked a federal court for help.24
To be sure, Batten's is an extreme case. Six years is an
unusually long time for a habeas petition to be pending in a
district court. 25 But increasingly, applicants across the country
are facing multi-year delays before a federal district court
decides their federal habeas petitions. 26 Quantifying the full
sweep of this delay problem is critical, in particular because
those charged with the functioning of the federal courts are not
even sure there is a problem at all. Indeed, in opposing
legislation that was designed to streamline the resolution of
19. Batten, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16923, at *8.
20. Freedom of Information Law, N.Y. Pub. Off. § 84-90 (2008).
21. The police reports also indicated that this suspect was deported after the
police alerted immigration authorities about him. Batten, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16923, at *45.
22. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that "the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution").
23. Batten, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16923, at *45 (holding there was "a
reasonable probability that, had [the police reports] been disclosed to the defense,
the result of the proceeding would have been different").
24. After losing its appeal, the State of New York chose not to retry Batten.
See Denise Buffa, "Bum Rap" Suit-'Wrong Killer" $laps City in '83 Bust, N.Y.
POsT, Dec. 31, 2004, at 23. Batten's habeas case was one of the five hundred that
were backlogged in the Eastern District of New York and subsequently
transferred in 2003 to Judge Jack B. Weinstein for disposition. See supra note 16.
25. See infra p. 380 (noting that only 10% of petitions filed from 1997 to 2006
required 2.3 years or more to be decided).
26. See infra pp. 377-80.
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habeas cases, the Secretary of the Judicial Conference of the
United States (Judicial Conference) has suggested it is unclear
"whether there is any unwarranted delay occurring in the
application of current law in resolving habeas corpus petitions
filed in federal courts by state prisoners." 27 If the federal
judiciary is unaware that the problem exists, it is not likely to
adopt any internal reforms to address the problem. 28
A failure to address habeas delay disregards the historic
office of the writ. Since the Parliament of England's statutory
efforts in the seventeenth century to establish strict time
deadlines for the processing of habeas matters, 29 judges have
been required to act promptly on habeas petitions in order to
safeguard the liberty of the subject. 30 Indeed, the original
purpose of habeas was at least as much to eliminate delay in
resolving a prisoner's status as it was to determine the legality
of detention.3 1 At its root, habeas corpus is fundamentally a
process for ensuring a speedy trial (in the case of a criminal
suspect) or a speedy hearing (in the case of non-judicial
both
Blackstone
and
Coke
detention). 32
executive
33
acknowledged the centrality of this principle and, as is

27. Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Sec'y, Judicial Conference of the
U.S., to Hon. Arlen Specter, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate 1
(Sept. 26, 2005) (emphasis added); see also id. at 2 (stating that in 2004 the total
number of non-capital habeas terminations was about the same as the number of
such petitions filed by state prisoners annually, that median disposition times had
remained constant since 1998 (at about six months), and that therefore "the
statistics appear to indicate that the district . . . courts are handling non-capital
habeas corpus petitions originating from state prisoners expeditiously").
28. Cf. THOMAS CHURCH, JR. ET AL., JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF
LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS 5 (1978) ("If any one element is essential to

the effort to reduce pretrial delay, it is concern by the court with delay as an
institutional and social problem.").
29. See Habeas Corpus Act, 1640, 16 Car., c. 10 (Eng.); Habeas Corpus Act,
1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (Eng.), discussed infra Part I.A.
30. See infra Part I.A.
31. See infra Part I.A.
32. See infra Part I.A.
33.

See EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS

OF ENGLAND 42 (Brooke, 5th ed. 1797) (English judges "have not suffered the
prisoner to be long detained, but at their next comming have given the prisoner
full and speedy justice . . . without detaining him long in prison.") (emphasis
added); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 131

(Neill H. Alford, Jr., et al. eds., The Legal Classics Library 1983) (1768) ("And by
[the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679], the methods are so plainly pointed out and
enforced, that, so long as this statute remains unimpeded, no subject of England
can long be detained in prison . . . .").
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discussed below, in the United States our statutes, court rules,
and case law all pay homage to it.34
Why then do federal judges seem to give such low priority
to habeas petitions pending on their dockets? As is suggested in
the last part of this Article, at least part of the explanation is,
ironically, a provision of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
(CJRA) that was intended to speed the resolution of civil
matters generally. Section 476 of the CJRA requires judges to
publish semi-annually a list of all motions appearing on their
dockets that have been unresolved for six months or more. 35
The provision was designed to incentivize judges to resolve
motions more promptly or face public shaming for failure to
manage their dockets efficiently. 36
Section 476 is one of the few reform measures instituted by
the CJRA that seems to have worked to make the courts
function more efficiently, and it is the only provision of the Act
that Congress subsequently renewed. 37 But habeas is a glaring
exception. The Judicial Conference has construed section 476 to
exempt habeas petitions from the six-month reporting
requirement 38-with the result that habeas motions are sent to
the back of the judges' to-do lists, even though by statute and
rule they should be near the front. Recognizing this strange
fact, this Article proposes a simple, effective, and low-cost
reform for ameliorating the habeas delay problem: The Judicial
Conference should reconsider its interpretation of section 476
of the CJRA and require district court judges to include habeas
motions in their six-month reports to the public. Incentives
matter, and even small and inexpensive changes can generate
a large payback.
Part I below reviews the common law history of habeas
and its ancient function as a kind of speedy trial analogue. It
also surveys American statutes, rules, and decisional law to
34. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-409 (1963) (noting that habeas
provides "a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or
confinement") (quoting Sec'y of State for Home Affairs v. O'Brien, [1923] A.C. 603,
609 (H.L.)).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 476(a) (2006).
36. See infra Part III.A.
37. See infra notes 172-80 and accompanying text.
38. See 18 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S., GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES § 540.70 [hereinafter ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE, POLICY GUIDE]
(reflecting Judicial Conference policy to exclude from the CJRA semi-annual
reporting requirement § 2254 habeas applications that have been pending more
than six months, but making six-month-old "secondary" motions and any pending
three-year-old § 2254 cases reportable).
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show that, as a formal matter, our civil justice system is
expected to move habeas petitions to the front of the courts'
dockets for prompt action. Part II establishes empirically that
swift resolution of habeas petitions is happening less and less
often for thousands of state-prisoner applications nationwide
and that delay is particularly pronounced in several problem
districts. Part III proposes alleviating the delay problem
through adoption of the same publication requirements to
which judges must adhere for all other civil motions.

I.

HABEAS AND THE ROOTS OF THE SPEEDINESS REQUIREMENT

Speed has always been of the essence in habeas matters.
Since at least the seventeenth century, a crucial function of the
writ has been to assure that the courts promptly address
prisoners' claims of illegal detention. 39 The Habeas Corpus Act
of 1679-the English statute that provided the foundation for
the right to habeas corpus enshrined in Article I of the U.S.
Constitution 40-was designed not only to address delaying
tactics deployed by the King and his councilors, but also to
mandate that the courts address habeas petitions immediately,
with fines specified for judges who failed to act with dispatch. 41
Delay, in short, was one of the chief evils against which habeas
historically was directed.
The first Section, below, briefly reviews the history of
habeas corpus in England in the seventeenth century,
explaining how the writ evolved into a set of procedures
designed to ensure prompt review of allegedly illegal
detentions. The next Section turns to the American context,
showing that the same concern for assuring swift judicial
review of detentions has served as a guiding principle for the
courts throughout the evolution of habeas jurisprudence in
America. The third Section reviews statutes and rules that
have been authorized by Congress to assure that habeas
petitions receive prompt attention from the federal district
courts. The final Section observes that, notwithstanding the
39. See infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
40. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 577 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., Wesleyan Univ. Press 1961) (discussing the importance of protecting habeas
in the Constitution by quoting Blackstone's encomiums to the Habeas Corpus Act
of 1679); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it.").
41. See infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
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history, case law, statutes, and rules previously discussed, the
courts have been reluctant to honor these provisions in
practice, due at least in part to their heavy dockets.
A. English Roots of Habeas and the Speed Requirement
The deep roots of habeas corpus lie in Magna Carta's
thirteenth century promise that "[nlo free man shall be seized
or imprisoned . .. except by the lawful judgement of his equals
or by the law of the land." 42 This provision famously struck
against the arbitrary exercise of the King's power to deprive
British subjects of their liberty, and it was the foundation on
which the rule of law in England was built. The "law of the
land" provision was not, however, self-interpreting or selfeffectuating. Who, for example, was to determine whether a
detention ordered by the King or his councilors was in accord
with law of the land-the King himself or the King's Bench, the
court that in theory derived its power from the monarch?43
Bringing the promise of Magna Carta to fruition has
required centuries of grappling with questions large and small,
ranging from the authority of the King's Bench and other
courts to oversee executive detentions44 to the technical
wording of the writs that commanded jailers to explain why
they were detaining a prisoner. 45 Eight centuries later, we are
still wrestling with many of these same issues. 46

42. Magna Carta, cl. 39 (England 1215) ("Nullus liber homo capiatur, vel
imprisonetur, aut disseisiatur, aut utlagetur, aut exuletur, aut aliquo modo
destruatur, nec super eum ibimus, nec super eum mittemus, nisi per legale
judicium parium suorum vel per legem terre."), photograph of original document
available at http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured-documents/magnacarta
/images/magnacarta.jpg, Latin transcriptavailable at http://www.thelatinlibrary
.com/magnacarta.html, and English translation available at http://www.law.ou.
edulushistory/magnacarta.shtml.
43. PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 75

(2010) ("If the king had a unique interest in his subjects' bodies, it stood to reason
that enacting that interest when he no longer sat in court himself should become
the function of the court claiming to be so close to his person that it was the king
himself. Or so many thought.. . .").
44. See id. at 11-38 (discussing jurisdictional battles); R.J. SHARPE, THE LAW
OF HABEAS CORPUS 4-15 (1976) (same).
45. HALLIDAY, supra note 43, at 51-53 (discussing modifications in language
of the writ).
46. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739 (2008) (recognizing the
need to begin to determine the extraterritorial scope of the writ).
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While this Article does not describe the ancient history of
the writ of habeas corpus, 47 the battles among Parliament, the
King, and the courts in the politically tumultuous seventeenth
century are worth briefly revisiting for what they reveal about
the importance of speed in the habeas process. On the eve of
Parliament's passage of the first Habeas Corpus Acts, the
power of the courts to check royal power over detention
decisions was contested and tenuous. The common law writ of
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum (the direct ancestor of what we
now commonly refer to as the writ of habeas corpus) had only
recently been developed by the King's Bench to review the
legality of imprisonments ordered by the King and his
councilors, 48 and the Crown's efforts to avoid judicial oversight
were frequent. 49 The King, of course, did not want his powers
circumscribed by the. King's Bench any more than modern
presidents want their wartime detention decisions to be
reviewable by the federal courts. It was common in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, for example, for the
King's Bench to order a jailer to explain on what grounds he
was detaining a prisoner, only to be told that the prisoner was
being detained on order of the King or his Privy Council, and
that therefore the detention was per se legal. 50
Two separate attempts were made by Parliament, in 1593
and 1621, to legislate executive compliance with the writ, but
both were unsuccessful.5 1 A constitutional crisis soon ensued,
precipitated by the infamous Darnel's Case (also known as the

47. For a fresh perspective on the history of the Writ, see generally HALLIDAY,
supra note 43. For a discussion of the history of habeas in the executive detention
context, see JONATHAN HAFETZ, HABEAS CORPUS AFTER 9/11, at 81-100 (2011);
Marc D. Falkoff, Back to Basics: Habeas Corpus Procedures and Long-Term
Executive Detention, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 961, 966-88 (2009).
48. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 126 (2d
ed. 1979) (describing the rise of this form of the writ in the sixteenth century).
There were a number of distinct writs with different names. As cataloged by
Blackstone, these included ad respondendum (for removing a prisoner from
confinement to answer a complaint brought against him), ad satisfaciendum (for
bringing a prisoner to a superior court for execution of a judgment), ad
prosequendum (for bringing a prisoner to be prosecuted), ad testificandum (for
bringing a prisoner to testify), and ad deliberandum (for bringing a prisoner into
the proper jurisdiction for trial). I BLACKSTONE, supra note 33, at 129-30.
49. See HALLIDAY, supra note 43, at 159.
50. For a full discussion of the development of the Writ's "return" requirement
(the obligation of the jailer to provide a full factual and legal justification for the
detention of a subject), see Falkoff, supra note 47, at 967-72.
51. See SHARPE, supranote 44, at 9 n.3 (noting the defeat of such bills in 1593
and 1621).
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Five Knights' Case) in 1627.52 Charles I sought to raise revenue
by demanding, without sanction from Parliament, a forced loan
from his subjects. Five knights refused to make the loans and
were arrested by Charles' agents. The knights sought a writ of
habeas corpus, claiming that their detention was illegal. 53 The
King's response was that if the King does it, then it's not
illegal. 54 The King's Bench accepted this answer and held that
the prisoners could not be bailed.55
Parliament was more successful in its legislative response
in the aftermath of Darnel's Case. Later in 1627 it passed the
Petition of Right, a declaration of grievances against Charles I.
In the Petition, Parliament noted that subjects had been
imprisoned "without any cause showed" and complained that
the only answer the King had given to habeas corpus writs was
that the prisoners were detained by his "special command."56
The King consented to the Petition, but he apparently did
so only after concluding that his power to detain his subjects
could not, as a result, be circumscribed by the King's Bench.57
Indeed, in fundamental ways, the King subsequently refused to
honor the Petition of Right in practice by deploying a host of
strategies to avoid judicial oversight of detention decisions.58
The King's Bench, in turn, sought to avoid confrontation with
the executive by deploying habeas writs sparingly and thus
delaying determination of the status of prisoners. 59

52. 3 St. Tr. 1, 31 (1627) (Doderidge, J.).
53. SHARPE, supra note 44, at 9.
54. The Executive's return stated only that the men were being detained "per
speciale mandatum domini regis," or by special order of the King. Counsel for the
prisoners argued, as per Magna Carta, that no detention was legal except "per
legem terre," or by the law of the land. In response, the Attorney General noted
that Magna Carta did not define "legem terre" and that the law of the land was
that the King could detain his subjects without giving an accounting of why to the
courts. Darnel's Case, 3 St. Tr. at 31.
55.

Id.

56. 3 Car., c. 1 (1627).
57. See SHARPE, supra note 44, at 14 n.2 (noting that, before consenting to the
Petition, Charles I had sought assurances from the King's Bench judges that it
would not restrain his powers); id. at 13-15 (quoting Six Members' Case, 3 St. Tr.
235, 281 (1629)) (discussing legal arguments propounded by Charles I in the
immediate aftermath of the Petition, including that he had "granted no new, but
only confirmed the ancient liberties of my subjects").
58. See id. at 13-15.
59. See HALLIDAY, supra note 43, at 160 (noting that release rates on habeas
corpus "plunged" during the reign of Charles I, and were not affected by the
Petition of Right); id. at 223 (stating that "the Petition did little to change judicial
work in the years immediately following" its passage).
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An infamous example of abusive delay tactics that were
countenanced by the King's Bench involved the case of John
Selden, who was a Member of Parliament, one of the lawyers in
the Five Knights' Case, and a moving force behind the drafting
of the Petition of Right. In March 1629, Selden led a group in
the House of Commons that held the speaker in his chair in an
attempt to prevent the dissolution of Parliament, which
Charles I had ordered. 60 Selden and the others were arrested
on the King's command and charged with "notable contempte
... and for stirreing up sedition against us." 6 1 The King refused
to offer the King's Bench a particularized justification for the
imprisonment, seemingly to test the limits of his detention
powers under the Petition of Right,62 and the King's Bench
largely acquiesced. As Blackstone described it, the judges in
Selden's case "delayed for two terms (including also the long
vacation)"63-about six months from the time of his arrest 64 "to deliver an opinion how far such a charge was bailable." 65
Blackstone wrote that it was such "pitiful evasions" that
gave rise to Parliament's passage of the Habeas Corpus Act of
1640,66 which sought to strengthen the court's review power

over executive detentions by requiring speedy compliance with
the writ. 67 As Blackstone summarized the Act, any person
committed by the King's order "shall have granted unto him,
without any delay upon any pretence whatsoever, a writ of
habeas corpus," and the judges were to "examine and
determine the legality of such commitment, and do what to

60. Id. at 224.
61. John Reeve, The Arguments in the King's Bench in 1629 Concerning the
Imprisonment of John Selden and Other Members of the House of Commons, 25 J.
BRIT. STUD. 264, 269 (1986).
62. See PAUL CHRISTIANSON, DISCOURSE ON HISTORY, LAW AND GOVERNANCE
IN THE PUBLIC CAREER OF JOHN SELDEN, 1610-1635, at 182 (1996).
63. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 33, at 134.

64. Selden was arrested on March 3, 1629, before the start of Easter Term.
CHRISTIANSON, supra note 62, at 180. He applied for a writ of habeas corpus on
May 6, and the King's "return" to the writ was filed on May 7. Id. at 182. Selden's
arguments for bail were heard before the King's Bench about a month later, on
June 5, during Trinity Term, id. at 182-84; the King's arguments were heard on
June 13, id. at 187. The King's Bench was set to issue its bail decision on June 24,
but the day before the King removed Selden to the Tower of London, leaving the
court unable to render its bail decision. Id. at 190. The court went on vacation
during the summer and did not issue their decision-that Selden should be
bailed-until the opening of Michaelmas Term, in October. Id. at 190-91.
65.
66.

3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 33, at 134.
Id.

67.

16 Car., c. 10 (1640).
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justice shall appertain, in delivering, bailing, or remanding
such prisoner" within three days of the return of the writ. 68
It soon became clear, however, that even this statutory
supplement to the common law powers of the King's Bench was
not completely effective. It was disputed, for example, whether
the writ could be awarded while the courts were in vacation-a
practice that had led to lengthy detentions. 69 Abuses continued,
including the movement of prisoners from jail to jail to avoid
the writ, or transportation to Scotland or other areas where the
writ in theory might not reach. 70 The King, in short, deployed a
series of delay tactics in an attempt to undermine the
effectiveness of the writ and its promise of court supervision
over his detention decisions, and the courts were complicit to
the degree that they countenanced tactics of delay and
avoidance.
Parliament sought to cure such problems once and for all
through passage of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.71 As the
preamble to the Act states, it was designed to combat the
"great delays" that jailers had made by refusing to answer
habeas writs until they had been reissued multiple times, and
"by other shifts to avoid their yeilding [o]bedience to such
Writts,

...

whereby many of the King's subjects have been and

hereafter may be long detained in prison, in such cases where
by law they are bailable, to their great charges and vexation." 72
68. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 33, at 135. Blackstone went on to note that
"[o]ther abuses had also crept into daily practice, which had in some measure
defeated the benefit of this great constitutional remedy. The party imprisoning
was at liberty to delay his obedience to the first writ, and might wait till a second
and a third, called an alias and a pluries, were issued, before he produced the
party: and many other vexatious shifts were practiced to detain state prisoners in
custody." Id.
69. As Paul Halliday has explained, prior to the mid-seventeenth century, the
King's Bench would in fact frequently issue a writ of habeas corpus during the
court's vacation, either with the actual teste date on it or by backdating it to the
last day of the previous term. HALLIDAY, supra note 43, at 56. Confusion about
whether the writ was available during vacation was sown by dictum from Sir
Edward Coke, who in his Institutes wrote that "neither the King's Bench nor
Common Pleas can grant [the habeas] writ but in the term time." Id. (quoting
Coke). Coke's dictum nonetheless led to the belief that, during the latter half of
the seventeenth century, the writ had not been available during vacation. See id.
at 236-37.
70. SHARPE, supra note 44, at 17.
71. Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (Eng.).
72. Id. Thus, the Act "contained provisions which were designed to ensure
that even where a prisoner was not entitled to immediate release, he would be
brought to trial with as little delay as possible." SHARPE, supra note 44, at 19
(citing §§ 6, 17, 18); see also id. at 133 ("[T]he most neglected aspect of habeas
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The Act itself is lengthy and detailed, providing a series of
requirements, including specific timing
particularized
provisions for, and penalties to be assessed against, both jailers
and justices who failed to comply with the Act's requirements.
These requirements included, for "the more speedy [relief] of all
persons imprisoned' on criminal matters, that jailers "shall
within [t]hree days after the [s]ervice" of a habeas corpus upon
them "make [return] of such [writ]" (with longer periods
allowed for imprisonments that are far from the court). 73
Failure to return the writ within these time periods made the
jailers liable to the prisoner for one hundred pounds for a first
offense and two hundred pounds for a second offense. 74 Any
person who was detained "in the Vacation time and out of
Terme" of the courts was explicitly entitled to apply for habeas
corpus to any of the justices of the court; the justices were
authorized to grant habeas corpus during this period and to
require that the jailer provide an "immediate" return (that is,
an explanation of the cause of detention).75 The failure of a
justice to issue the writ during vacation time when it was
"required to be granted" by the Act made the justice liable to
the prisoner for five hundred pounds. 76
As these strict time deadlines suggest, combating delay
was a chief purpose of the Act-the "very hub of the design."77
After passage of the Act, no person could be held for more than
two terms without trial or release.78 At least for those prisoners
detained on suspicion of having committed a crime, the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1679 thus functioned, in short, much like the

corpus has been its use as a device to secure the right of accused persons, detained
pending their trial, to be either tried quickly or released.").
73. Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2, T 1 (Eng.).
74. Id. 1 4.
75. Id. 2 (emphasis added).
76.

Id.

77. SHARPE, supra note 44, at 133. See also 1 J. CHITTY, CRIMINAL LAW 13031 (1816) ("But the principal ground for bailing upon habeas corpus, and indeed
the evil the writ was chiefly intended to remedy, is the neglect of the accuser to
prosecute in due time.").
78. The "design of the Act," according to one English judge, "was to prevent a
man's lying under an accusation for treason, &c. above two terms." Crosby's Case,
[1694] 12 Eng. Rep. 66 (P.C.). According to another judge, its object "was to
provide against delays in bringing persons to trial, who were committed for
criminal matters." Exparte Beeching, [1825] 107 Eng. Rep. 1010 (P.C.); 4 B. & C.
137. A third explained that the Act "was directed specifically to the abuse of
detaining persons in prison without bail and without bringing them to trial." In re
Hastings, [1959] 1 Q.B. 358, at 369 (U.K.).
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modern speedy trial right.7 9 It is unsurprising, given this
history, that expeditious access to the habeas courts would be
recognized in the American context as crucial to protecting the
individual's liberty.
B. Habeas and Speed in the American Context
Judicial protection of a citizen's liberty by the writ of
habeas corpus was part of America's patrimony from England.
The framers of the Constitution knew the history leading up to
Parliament's passage of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679,80 and
they understood that prompt judicial review was integral to the
functioning of the writ, since habeas was "the great remedy ...
by which the judicial power speedily and effectually protects
the personal liberty of every individual."8 1
Indeed, the first draft of the Suspension Clause, as
proposed by Charles Pinckney of Virginia, made the
importance of speed explicit: "The privileges and benefit of the
writ of habeas corpus shall be enjoyed in this government in
the most expeditious and ample manner: and shall not be
suspended by the Legislature except upon the most urgent and
pressing occasions, and for a limited time not exceeding
months."82 The first Congress immediately authorized the
federal courts to issue the writ for federal prisoners in the
Judiciary Act of 1789.83 And, as Joseph Story explained, the
79. See generally SHARPE, supra note 44, at 133-40 (discussing the derivation
of the speedy trial right from habeas). By its terms the Habeas Corpus Act
regulated only criminal detentions, and the protections of the writ of habeas
corpus were not extended by statute to non-criminal detainees in England until
the Habeas Corpus Act, 1816, 56 Geo. 3, c. 100 (Eng.). In practice, however, the
procedural protections of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 were extended by judges
to prisoners in non-criminal cases. See ALBERT V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 219 & n.2 (London, Macmillan & Co.
4th ed. 1893).
80. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S 723, 739-40 (2008).
81. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 117 (photo. reprint 2003) (2d ed. 1829). See also Ex parte Randolph,
20 F. Cas. 242, 252-53 (C.C.D. Va. 1833) (discussing the "celebrated habeas
corpus act of 31 Charles II., . . . which, in practice, by reason of its valuable
provisions for insuring speedy action, has almost superseded the common law").
82. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 334 (Max
Farrand ed., Yale University Press 1911). The provision was modified and came
out of the Committee of Style as, "[t]he privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended; unless where in cases of rebellion or invasion the public
safety may require it." Id. at 435. The word where would be changed to when in
the ratified version of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
83. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82.
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Act was, "in substance, incorporated into the jurisprudence of
every state in the Union; and the right to it has been secured in
most, if not in all, of the state constitutions by a provision,
similar to that existing in the constitution of the United
States."84

Praise for habeas as a guarantor of speedy justice is
common in our early decisional law. As Chief Justice Taney
stated, the "great and inestimable value" of our habeas corpus
inheritance in America was that it "compel[led] courts and
judges, and all parties concerned, to perform their duties
promptly."85 Other courts noted that there was "no other
remedy known to the law, which is so speedy and effectual,"86
and even that the liberty of the people depended on the courts'
insistence on "ready compliance" with the writ.87
Until after the Civil War, the writ was available only for
federal prisoners.88 Congress did not give the federal courts
statutory authority to grant the writ to state prisoners until it
passed the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, which in modern form

84.

3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED

STATES § 1335 (1833) (footnote omitted). The Massachusetts Constitution, for
example, stated that the "privilege and benefit of the writ of habeas corpus shall
be enjoyed in this commonwealth, in the most free, easy, cheap, expeditious, and
ample manner." MASS. CONST. chp. VI, art. VII. See also N.H. CONST. of 1784, in 4
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR
HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2469 (Francis Newton

Thorpe ed. 1909); VT. CONST. of 1793 § 41 (as amended through 2002) (stating
that the legislature shall assure the writ provides "a speedy and effectual remedy
in all cases proper therefor"); Act of Dec. 12, 1712, 2 S.C. STAT. 399-401 (adopting
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679).
85. Exparte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 150 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (Taney, C.J.).
86. Norris v. Newton, 18 F. Cas. 322, 324 (C.C.D. Ind. 1850).
87. In re Stacy, 10 Johns. 328, 332 (N.Y. 1813) (quoting King v. Winton, 5
Term. R. 89 (1792)) ("[T]he courts always looked with a watchful eye at the
returns to writs of habeas corpus; that the liberty of the subject essentially
depended on a ready compliance with the requisitions of the writ. . . .").
88. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (providing that
"writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where
they are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States."); Ex
parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807) (stating that unless Congress had
passed a statute authorizing the federal courts to grant the writ, "the privilege
itself would be lost, although no law for its suspension should be enacted"). But
see Eric M. Freedman, Just Because John Marshall Said It, Doesn't Make It So:
Ex Parte Bollman and the Illusory Prohibition on the Federal Writ of Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners in the JudiciaryAct of 1789, 51 ALA. L. REV. 531, 537
(2000) (arguing that the federal courts had common law power to issue the writ
for state prisoners).
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has been codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254.89 Nonetheless, whenever
the federal courts have reflected on their authority to
determine the legality of a state prisoner's detention, they have
acknowledged a correlate responsibility to exercise their duties
expeditiously.
Habeas
applications challenging illegal
detention, after all, are concerned with the arbitrariness of any
kind of detention, whether authorized by the executive solely or
by another judicial body. 90
Thus, in case after case filed by state prisoners under
section 2254, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the chief
value of habeas is "to provide a prompt and efficacious remedy
for whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints,"91 and
that the state prisoner seeking federal court protection must be
afforded "a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal
restraint upon personal liberty."92 The Court has said, "time
and again, that prompt resolution of prisoners' claims is a
principal function of habeas." 93
Accordingly, the lower federal courts have recognized that
section 2254 cases must (at least in theory) jump to the front of
the courts' dockets. 94 As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit has stated, an "application for the writ usurps the
attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who
entertains it and receives prompt action from him."95
89. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006)).
90.

CARY FEDERMAN, THE BODY AND THE STATE: HABEAS CORPUS AND

AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 165 (Robert J. Spitzer ed., 2006) (noting, in discussion
of habeas as a way to challenge both executive detentions and court-authorized
detentions, that "there is no real divergence in either habeas' goal of freeing the
unlawfully detained").
91. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1963).
92. Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 283 (1948); see also Fay, 372 U.S. at 400
(using same "swift and imperative" language); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234,
238 (1968) (purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 "is to provide an effective and speedy
instrument by which judicial inquiry may be had into the legality of the detention
of a person") (citation omitted).
93. Chatman-Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1981); Braden v. 30th Jud. Circuit Court of Ky.,
410 U.S. 484 (1973)).
94. See Post v. Gilmore, 111 F.3d 556, 557 (7th Cir. 1997); Chatman-Bey, 864
F.2d at 814 ("Delay is undesirable in all aspects of our justice system, but it is
especially to be avoided in the sensitive context of habeas corpus.").
95. Ruby v. United States, 341 F.2d 585, 587 (9th Cir. 1965); see also Yong v.
INS, 208 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting, in denying a government
request for a stay in a habeas deportation case, that "[s]pecial solicitude is
required because the writ is intended to be a 'swift and imperative remedy in all
cases of illegal restraint or confinement' ") (quoting Fay, 372 U.S. at 400 (1963));
Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that fourteen-month
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C. Speed Required by Statute and Rule
Speedy disposition of state-prisoner habeas applications is
mandated by both statute and rule. Most importantly, 28
U.S.C. § 1657 requires the federal courts to expedite habeas
petitions: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, each
court of the United States shall determine the order in which
civil actions are heard and determined, except that the court
shall expedite the consideration of any action brought under
chapter 153 . . . ."96 As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit has explained, "[1]iberty's priority over compensation is
why 28 U.S.C. § 1657 specifies that requests for collateral relief
go to the head of the queue."97
In addition to section 1657, the habeas statute itself sets
strict time limits for the processing of habeas petitions.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243, a court entertaining an
application for a writ of habeas corpus must "forthwith award
the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show
cause why the writ should not be granted."98 The prisoner's
custodian must then respond to the petition "within three days
unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty
days, is allowed." 99 Upon receiving the return certifying the
cause of the prisoner's detention, the court must set a date for
hearing "not more than five days after the return unless for

delay in deciding habeas petition denied state prisoner due process, and stating
that "[t~he writ of habeas corpus, challenging illegality of detention, is reduced to
a sham if the trial courts do not act within a reasonable time") (footnote omitted).
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1657(a) (2006). Chapter 153 consists of the habeas provisions
that have been codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241, et seq. Section 1657 also requires
expedited consideration of actions brought under "section 1826 of this title, any
action for temporary or preliminary injunctive relief, or any other action if good
cause therefor is shown."
97. Post, 111 F. 3d at 557; see also Ruby, 341 F.2d at 587 ("The ordinary rules
of civil procedure are not intended to apply thereto, at least in the initial,
emergency attention given as prescribed by statute to the application for the
writ."); Van Buskirk v. Wilkinson, 216 F.2d 735, 737-38 (9th Cir. 1954) (finding
habeas is "a speedy remedy, entitled by statute to special, preferential
consideration to insure expeditious hearing and determination"); McClellan v.
Young, 421 F.2d 690, 691 (6th Cir. 1970) (same); Fischer v. Ozaukee Cnty. Circuit
Court, 741 F. Supp. 2d 944, 962 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (rejecting state's motion to
reconsider grant of habeas petition on the grounds that the court acted too swiftly,
and "remind[ing] the respondent that in the context of petitions for writs of
habeas corpus, courts are explicitly required by law to expedite the consideration
of these cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1657(a)").
98. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2006) (emphasis added).
99. Id. (emphasis added).
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good cause additional time is allowed."10 0 These specific
deadlines recall, of course, those of the Habeas Corpus Act of
1679 itself.
Notwithstanding this specificity, the district courts
routinely ignore the deadlines set forth by 28 U.S.C. § 2243.101
District court judges rely instead on Rule 4 of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases, which has been assumed to
supplant the statutory deadlines. 102 Rule 4 replaces the strict
time limits of section 2243 with discretionary language:
The original petition shall be presented promptly to a judge
of the district court in accordance with the procedure of the
court for the assignment of its business. The petition shall
be examined promptly by the judge to whom it is assigned.
If it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any
exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to
relief in the district court, the judge shall make an order for
its summary dismissal and cause the petitioner to be
notified. Otherwise the judge shall order the respondent to
file an answer or other pleading within the period of time
fixed by the court or to take such other action as the judge
deems appropriate. 103

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 4 state that the
rule was designed to give the district courts "greater flexibility
than under § 2243 in determining within what time period an
answer must be made."' 04 There is a strong argument to be
made that Rule 4 should not be read as a license to district
courts to ignore the time limitations of section 2243.105
100. Id. (emphasis added); see also Glynn v. Donnelly, 470 F.2d 95, 99 (1st Cir.
1972) (stating that, in general, 28 U.S.C. § 2243 manifests policy that habeas
petitions are to be heard promptly).
101. Senior Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York has
made similar observations. See, e.g., Mem. to Special Master Respecting
Timeliness of Decisions on Petitions of Persons in State Custody, In re Habeas
Corpus Cases, 216 F.R.D. 52, 53 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
102. See, e.g., Kramer v. Jenkins, 108 F.R.D. 429, 431 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
103. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Rules Governing § 2254. Rule 4. Preliminary
Consideration by Judge) (1976) (emphasis added).
104. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 advisory committee's note (Rule 4. Preliminary
Review; Serving the Petition and Order) (2006).
105. Congress's authorization to the Supreme Court to promulgate rules is
restricted to "the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure" that
"shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right" so that "[aill laws in
conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have
taken effect." 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). As Judge Weinstein has observed, the
Advisory Committee (and the district courts that have followed the Advisory
Committee's commentary) must have understood Rule 4 to be in conflict with, and
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Nonetheless, whether the courts should be obliged to follow the
explicit time limits in section 2243, or instead to respect the
more general language requiring that judges act on habeas
petitions "promptly," it is clear that section 1657, section 2243,
and the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, taken together,
indicate that Congress intended that the federal courts decide
habeas petitions in a speedy manner, consistent with historical
practice.
D. Busy Court Dockets Trump Statute and Rule
The Judicial Conference, at least, believes that these rules
and statutory provisions are sufficient to ensure that the
federal courts act with disposition on habeas matters. 106 And,
occasionally, the federal appellate courts have cited section
1657 when ordering district court judges to decide individual
petitions that have been pending for lengthy periods. 07
But, by and large, the federal courts have been
unsympathetic to arguments from habeas petitioners that their
applications should move to the front of the line for decision.
The reason is a practical one-the district court judges believe
thus to supplant, the stricter time limits of § 2243. See In re Habeas Corpus
Cases, 216 F.R.D. at 54 (citing Castillo v. Pratt, 162 F. Supp. 2d 575, 577 (N.D.
Tex. 2001); Wyant v. Edwards, 952 F. Supp. 348, 352-53 (S.D.W. Va. 1997)). It is,
however, not clear that the rule and the statute are necessarily in conflict. See id.
at 53 (noting that Rule 4's requirement that respondent file an answer "within the
period of time fixed by the court" is compatible with section 2243, allowing the
district court to use its discretion to set a response date, but only up to 20 days
from issuance of the court's order to show cause).
106. See Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 3035 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1 (2005) (letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Sec'y, to F.
James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (objecting to
provision in the proposed Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005 that would have
required the circuit courts to decide habeas appeals within 300 days of the
conclusion of briefing, by noting that "Section 1657 already requires courts, both
trial and appellate, to expedite consideration of any action brought under chapter
153 [of Title 28, United States Code], which includes habeas corpus proceedings")
(internal quotation marks omitted).
107. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, for example, granted a
petition for a writ of mandamus to a section 2255 habeas petitioner whose
application had been pending without action in the district court for more than
three years. In re Hicks, 118 F. App'x 778, 778 (4th Cir. 2005). Ordering the
district court to decide the motion within sixty days, the Fourth Circuit noted that
"[wirits of habeas corpus are intended to afford a speedy remedy to those illegally
restrained," and that "[p]ursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1657(a) (2000), the district court
must give priority to habeas corpus cases over other civil cases." Id. (citation
omitted).
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they are simply overwhelmed with habeas applications. In
Marutz v. United States, for example, a judge from the Eastern
District of California expressed (understandable) exasperation
with a petitioner who was expressing his own (understandable)
frustration with the failure of the magistrate in his case to
decide his habeas petition, which had been pending for more
than two years without decision. The judge explained,
[T]his court faces an unprecedented backlog of habeas
applications, all but a fraction of which are from prisoners
proceeding without counsel. From January 1, 2004, through
December 31, 2007, California prisoners commenced more
than 2,600 actions seeking habeas corpus relief from the
Sacramento Division of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of California. Thus, while the court is
aware that movant's application has been submitted for
some time now, others have been submitted longer. This
court's general policy is to resolve habeas petitions in the
order in which they were submitted for decision, regardless
of whether the movant is represented by counsel. Counsel
cites no precedent or rule which requires the court to permit
a later-submitted habeas petition to usurp its attention
from that of an earlier one .

. .

. There is no question that

this court is not staffed adequately to resolve all, or even
most, of the submitted habeas actions within 60, 90 or even
120 days. 10 8
Heavy habeas dockets similarly led the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit to dismiss a petitioner's argument that
delay in deciding his section 2255 motion (the analogue for
federal prisoners of a section 2254 petition) violated section
1657, stating that while "28 U.S.C. § 1657 requires that courts
expedite such actions," the "requirement is relative, not
specific," and the petitioner had failed to show that resolution
of his petition "was delayed beyond the requirements of the
court's docket."1 09

108. Marutz v. United States, No. Cr. S-93-0016, 2008 U.S. Dist LEXIS 46890,
at *5-6 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 2008) (footnotes omitted) (discussing a § 2255 habeas
application).
109. United States v. Samples, 897 F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 1990); cf. In re
Gates, No. 92-3179, 1992 WL 403016, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 30, 1992) (denying
mandamus petition filed by a section 2255 petitioner, stating that he had failed to
show that "the district court has unduly delayed acting on his motion to vacate
sentence," but noting also that "[iun light of 28 U.S.C. § 1657(a) (requiring
expedition of actions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255), however, we are confident
that the district court will promptly dispose of Gates's motion"); Hale v. Lockhart,
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Other appellate courts have been less forgiving of the
"busy court dockets" rationale for failing to decide habeas
petitions promptly. 110 In 1990, the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit found that a fourteen-month delay in the
processing of a habeas application was a due process violation,
and held the district court's backlog and heavy caseload were
unjustified, because if such delay were acceptable, "the function
of the Great Writ would be eviscerated."III
As discussed below, however, fourteen-month delays in the
resolution of habeas petitions have now become the norm
rather than the exception.
II.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF HABEAS DELAY

The following Sections quantify the scope of habeas delay
in the federal courts. Although by statute and rule, the district
courts must accord priority treatment to habeas matters, from
1996 (the year that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act, or "AEDPA," was passed into law) to 2008 (the
last year for which the Administrative Office has made full civil
case processing data available), an increasing proportion of the
petitions on the courts' habeas dockets have required one, two,
three, or more years before decision. 112 During this same
period, there has been a decreasing proportion of petitions
terminated within six months of filingl 1 3-an amount of time
that this Article will later suggest is reasonable for deciding a
habeas petition (except in extraordinary cases) and that should
serve as an appropriate benchmark for measuring the courts'
efficiency.11 4 The increasing proportion of "aged" petitions is
even more acute in certain districts, where a habeas petition
will likely require more than a year to be decided." 5 This Part
903 F.2d 545, 547-48 (8th Cir. 1990) (no due process violation where three years
elapsed between filing of habeas petition and decision by the district court).
110. See, e.g., Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that
fourteen-month delay in processing of habeas petition was due process violation,
and refusing to accept "busy court dockets" as a justification for the delay).
111. Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283, 1284 (10th Cir. 1990). The Rogers court
further stated, "[i]t may be that the district court will need to seek additional
resources or reallocate its existing resources to enable it more promptly to resolve
the large number of petitions for writ of habeas corpus pending on its docket." Id.
at 1285.
112. See infra pp. 378-86.
113. See infra pp. 383-85.
114. See infra Part III.C.
115. See infra Part II.C.
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will fully discuss these and other observations about the
lengthy delays in the resolution of habeas matters.
The first Section below describes the design of the study.
The second Section looks at the state of the nationwide district
court habeas docket as a whole. The third Section turns to
individual districts with particularly fast and slow mean
disposition times for habeas matters and highlights the depth
of the delay problem in the "slowest" districts.
A. Study Design
This study is the first to gather and analyze information
about the entire population of non-capital federal habeas
applications filed by state prisoners between fiscal years 1996
and 2008.116 It is not a sampling study; instead, it describes
116. Scholars have, of course, published empirical work on federal habeas
before now. Among the earliest was a study of all federal habeas petitions filed in
Massachusetts between 1970 and 1972, which concluded that the district was
managing its habeas docket efficiently. David L. Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus:
A Study in Massachusetts, 87 HARV. L. REV. 321, 332, 333 tbl.III (1973) (finding
that most of the 353 petitions had been decided "in a relatively short time," with a
median disposition time "somewhat less than one month," with only eight
petitions requiring more than one year to decide). In 1979, Paul H. Robinson
reviewed all habeas petitions filed from 1975 to 1977 in six district courts, and
found that the mean disposition time for the 1899 petitions was only about four
and one half months. PAUL H. ROBINSON, FEDERAL JUSTICE RESEARCH PROGRAM,
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF STATE COURT

JUDGMENTS 5, 42 (1979); see also id. 4(b) (observing that more than half of the
petitions were dismissed quickly on procedural grounds, and concluding the "data
support the beliefs that the actual processing of most petitions is performed with
less investment of judicial time and resources than would be required in a
traditional lawsuit, but that the sheer act of processing such a large number of
complaints has impact upon courts"); Karen M. Allen et al., Federal Habeas
Corpus and Its Reform: An Empirical Analysis, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 675, 704 (1982)
(reviewing Robinson's data and noting that mean disposition time was markedly
different across districts, ranging from 99 to 227 days). A 1995 study produced for
the Bureau of Justice Statistics ("BJS") sampled eighteen federal district courts
and found that the fastest ten percent of state-prisoner habeas petitions were
decided in less than a month, while the slowest ten percent took on average more
than two years to be decided. ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY W.K. DALEY, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW: CHALLENGING STATE COURT

CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS, at v (1995). Another BJS study from 1996 discussed
disposition times for all petitions that were terminated by the courts in 1995, and
found that for this limited population the mean processing time was about 293
days, with the fastest ten percent decided within 20 days, and the slowest ten
percent within 735 days. JOHN SCALIA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONER PETITIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, 1980-96, at 7
(1997); see also JOHN SCALIA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, PRISONER PETITIONS FILED IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, 2000, WITH

TRENDS

1980-2000

(2002)

[hereinafter

SCALIA,

1980-2000

REPORT]

(not
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and analyzes information about all of the 207,308 habeas
applications filed in the federal district courts during this
period, in part to document the absolute number of stateprisoner habeas petitions that have appeared on the courts'
dockets since 1996.
This Article uses data sets compiled by the Administrative
Office, made available for researchers at the website for the
Consortium for Political and Social
Inter-University
117
There are two reasons 1996 was selected as the
Research.
start date. First, 1996 was the year Congress passed AEDPA
into law,118 and information about cases appearing on the
courts' docket in this year thus provides a useful baseline for
assessing the state of the courts' docket in the wake of the
profound procedural and substantive changes in habeas
jurisprudence initiated by AEDPA. Second, as a practical
matter, 1996 was the earliest year for inclusion in the study
because it was the first year in which the Administrative Office
gathered case-processing data that allowed a researcher to
distinguish state-prisoner, non-capital habeas petitions from
other types of habeas cases. 119 The study ends with 2008
addressing disposition times). In 2006, a Congressional Research Service Report,
relying on Administrative Office summaries of its civil processing data, compared
median processing times for a set of non-capital habeas petitions filed pre-AEDPA
(between 1990 and 1996) and post-AEDPA (1997 to 2004), and concluded that the
median disposition time had remained steady over these periods. See LISA M.
SEGHETTI & NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33259, FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF: BACKGROUND, LEGISLATION, AND ISSUES 2 (2006)

(finding median disposition time pre-AEDPA ranged from low of 5.6 months in
1995 to high of 6.6 months in 1992, with median disposition time post-AEDPA
ranging from low of 5.2 months in 2000 to high of 6.9 months in 2002). But in
2007, an in-depth empirical study of federal habeas matters found that the mean
processing time of a nationwide sample of cases filed in 2003 and 2004 was 11.5
months, with a median of 8.1 months, leading the authors to conclude that the
overall disposition time per case had increased on average since the passage of
AEDPA. See KING REPORT, supra note 18, at 43 (concluding, from their sample of
2384 noncapital federal habeas petitions filed by state prisoners, that postAEDPA the fastest ten percent of cases were terminated more quickly, but that
the slowest twenty-five percent took a month longer on average than before
passage of AEDPA, with all non-capital petitions averaging at least a year in
federal court before they were decided). The King Report, though it samples only
cases that were initiated in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, provides a wealth of
information about the processing of habeas cases post-AEDPA. See id. at 15.
117. The ICPSR website is http://www.icpsr.umich.edu.
118. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 21
U.S.C. (2006)).
119. Unless otherwise noted, all references to years in the remainder of the
Article should be understood to mean fiscal years (ending September 30) rather
than calendar years.
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because, as of the drafting of this Article, that is the last year
for which the Administrative Office has made complete data
available.120
The Administrative Office annually releases two sets of
data on civil caseloads in the federal courts. The first includes
information about all cases "terminated" in the fiscal year; the
second includes information about all cases that remained
pending on the courts' dockets (that is, appeared on the courts'
dockets but were not terminated) as of the end of the fiscal
year. 121 In order to paint a full portrait of the courts' dockets,
the annual data sets for "terminated" petitions from 1996 to
2008 were merged, along with the "pending" data set from
2008.122 Only civil cases that were coded as 28 U.S.C. § 2254
petitions were retained for this study. 123 The information

120. The Administrative Office makes summary statistical tables about civil
case data available to the general public annually on its website,
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics.aspx. As of
the publishing of this Article, those summary tables are current through 2010,
but, as noted above, the data sets from which the Administrative Office derived
their tables have not been released to the ICPSR website. For a mild critique of
the manner in which the Administrative Office makes statistical information
available in a timely manner to the public, see Rebecca Love Kourlis & Pamela A.
Gagel, Reinstalling the Courthouse Windows: Using Statistical Data to Promote
Judicial Transparency and Accountability in Federal and State Courts, 53 VILL.
L. REV. 951, 954-60 (2008) (noting that the information collected by the
government "only scratch[es] the surface of federal statistical and case
management data" and that a wealth of information is potentially available from
PACER and the C1VECF systems, but that "[u]nfortunately, the information
available to the general public, court observers and academicians is not yet
comprehensive and lacks some functionality"). See also infra note 200 (discussing
the historic difficulty of accessing CJRA semi-annual reports on district court
dockets).
121. See, e.g., INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
RESEARCH, FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE 2008 iii-iv (2009).

For 2008, however, the Administrative Office released "pending" data that was
collected for the calendar year (ending December 31, 2008) rather than the fiscal
year (ending September 30, 2008). The Administrative Office has released a data
set for "terminated" cases for fiscal year 2009, but has not released an updated
"pending" dataset for fiscal year 2009.
122. See John Shapard, How Caseload Statistics Deceive 1 (Aug. 9, 1991)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Colorado Law Review)
(explaining that "terminated cases are not representative of the court's caseload").
Because "pending" data for 2009 has not been released yet, petitions initiated in
2009 could not be included in this study.
123. Typically, cases were retained for the study as 28 U.S.C. § 2254
applications if they were coded by the Administrative Office as NOS=530,
TITL=28, and SECTION=2254. For 2000, however, the Administrative Office's
raw data contained a (readily identifiable) coding error: a subset of cases that
were coded as NOS=530 were also coded as TITL-282 and SECTION=254, and no
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gathered includes filing and termination dates for each
petition, as well as the identity of the district court in which
the petition was filed.
The habeas petitions analyzed here do not include any filed
by federal prisoners, 124 by detainees seeking to avoid
deportation, 125 or by alleged "enemy combatants" challenging
the legality of their war-time detentions. 126 Instead, this study
focuses entirely on section 2254 petitions, where the applicant's
imprisonment has already been authorized by the state court
after a criminal trial and appellate process.
Section 2254 applications may only be granted for
violations of federal law, and the violations must not have been
harmless. 127 In addition, pursuant to AEDPA,128 an applicant
may be granted relief pursuant to section 2254 only if he has
"exhausted" all of his claims in the state courts before
presenting them to a federal judge,129 has not procedurally
defaulted on those claims in state court, 130 and has proven to
the federal judge that the state court's ruling on the federal
claims "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

cases were coded as TITL=28 and SECTION=2254. Cases that were coded in this
manner were retained for the study.
124. Federal prisoner petitions are filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006).
125. Challenges to avoid deportation are typically filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2241 (2008). See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 306-08 (2001).
126. Challenges to executive detentions during the War on Terror are properly
raised through 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004),
superseded by statute, Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119
Stat. 2739; Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 799 (2008) (Souter, J., concurring).
127. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006) (courts may entertain applications for writ from
state prisoners only if the allegation is that the custody is "in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States"); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507
U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993) (stating that habeas relief is available only where
"constitutional error of the trial type" resulted in "actual prejudice" to defendant).
128. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 21
U.S.C. (2006)).
129. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2006). The exhaustion requirement in the
statute was previously recognized in decisional law in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.
509, 522 (1982), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. 2254(c).
130. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) ("In all cases in which
a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an
independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the
claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and
actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate
that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of
justice.").
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by the Supreme Court of the United States." 31 The procedural
obstacles the state prisoner must navigate are many, and the
standards for obtaining the writ-and retrial or release from
state prison-are difficult to meet. In addition, AEDPA
introduced a one-year filing deadline (from the date that the
criminal conviction becomes final) for state prisoners who wish
to petition the federal courts for the writ. 132
At the time of AEDPA's passage in April 1996, the number
of section 2254 petitions filed annually was impressive. More
than 10,000 petitions had been initiated each year during the
early 1990s, which was up from roughly 7000 to 9000 annually
during the 1970s and 1980s. 133 Back in the early 1960s, fewer
than 2000 such petitions were filed annually,134 which in
retrospect seems an almost trivial number. But everything is
relative: In 1944, federal judges were complaining about an
"avalanche" and "deluge" of 605 petitions that had been filed in
total in the federal courts that year. 135
If Congress's ambition in passing AEDPA was to reduce
the number of petitions filed in the federal courts, its goal was
not met. 136 The one-year filing deadline (predictably) led to a
spike in the number of habeas filings in the year following
AEDPA's effective date-from 12,276 in 1996 to 17,015 in
1997.137 But since then, the filing rate has (less predictably)
131. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006).
132. Id. State prisoners whose convictions became final prior to passage of
AEDPA (on April 24, 1996) were given a one-year grace period in which to file a
habeas petition (that is, until April 24, 1997). See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214,
216-17 (2002).
133. VICTOR E. FLANGO, HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 14
tbl.1 (1994).
134. See id.
135. See id. at 9.
136. Habeas Reform: The Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005: Hearing on S.
1088 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,109th Cong. 71-72 (2005), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=e655f9e2809e5476862f735d
al0cdeda&wit id=e655f9e2809e5476862f735dal0cdeda-1-1 (testimony of Ronald
Eisenberg, Deputy Dist. Att'y, Phila., Pa.) [hereinafter Eisenberg Testimony] ("The
Administrative Office points with apparent pride to its claim that disposition time
for non-capital cases has remained relatively constant [over the last six years]
.... [But] AEDPA was supposed to speed things up. Significant new provisions
like the time bar, if honestly applied, should have reduced disposition times,
especially for non-capital cases. If, as the Administrative Office says, we are
seeing at best a holding action for non-capital cases . . . then there can be no
clearer proof that habeas reform, as interpreted by the federal courts, has not
succeeded." (emphasis omitted)).
137. State prisoners whose convictions were final before passage of AEDPA
had until April 24, 1997, to file a habeas petition without running afoul of
AEDPA's one-year filing deadline. Carey, 536 U.S. at 216-17.
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remained steady at the elevated level, never returning
anywhere close to pre-AEDPA rates. 138 In a word, since the
passage of AEDPA, the federal district courts have simply been
inundated with newly filed habeas petitions. 139
How well have the federal district courts responded to the
modern "avalanche" and "deluge" of section 2254 petitions? To
the degree the courts have decided roughly as many habeas
motions as are filed each year, has the mean or median age of
the cases appearing on the courts' dockets increased,
decreased, or remained steady? Does the disposition rate
remain uniform across the country, or all other things being
equal, does the length of time that a petition remains open
depend on the district in which it was filed? Absent a
comprehensive study like the one presented here, it is
impossible to gauge whether the courts are keeping current
with their habeas caseloads. 140

138. See infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
139. An analysis by John Scalia of the Department of Justice's Bureau of
Justice Statistics showed that both AEDPA and an increasing prison population
had statistically significant effects on the number of habeas petitions filed
between 1996 and 2000. See SCALIA, 1980-2000 REPORT, supra note 116, at 6-7
(estimating that between 1996 and 2000, an additional 18,000 habeas petitions
were filed by state prisoners as a result of enactment of AEDPA, and that an
additional 5,900 petitions were filed as a result of a 160,000-inmate increase in
the state prison population during this period).
140. While the judiciary has registered uncertainty about whether the district
courts are keeping abreast of their habeas dockets, see supra note 27 and
accompanying text, some politicians perceive a delay problem. Senator Jon Kyl
proposed legislation, called the Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, S. 1088, H.R.
3035, 109th Cong. (2005), which would have imposed an enhanced series of
limitations on the availability of the writ (including hard deadlines for the circuit
courts to resolve habeas appeals) in part because of the perception that habeas
petitioners were content to allow the courts to "drag out the [habeas] litigation for
years." Eisenberg Testimony, supra note 136, at 66-67. But unlike petitioners
facing execution, non-capital petitioners have every incentive to proceed
expeditiously in order to cut short the sentences they are serving. See, e.g.,
Streamlined ProceduresAct of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 3035 Before the Subcomm.
on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 65 (2005) (Statement of Ruth E. Friedman) ("Ninety-nine percent of state
prisoners are serving prison sentences they hope to cut short by winning federal
habeas corpus relief."); Habeas Corpus Proceedings and Issues of Actual
Innocence: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 386 (2005)
(Testimony of John Pressley Todd, Esq., Assistant Att'y Gen., Ariz. Att'y Gen.'s
Office) ("Unlike the non-capital defendant who is serving his sentence during the
habeas process and has every incentive to proceed as quickly as possible to have a
federal court vindicate a constitutional claim that the state courts wrongly
decided, the capital defendant is not serving his sentence. [Rather,] he is avoiding
it.").
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B. The Big Picture:Delay Across the Nation
Annual Filings Surge, Steady, Then Ease. The number of
habeas petitions that the federal courts must deal with every
year is stunning. In 1996, the year that Congress passed
AEDPA, state prisoners filed just over 12,000 noncapital
habeas petitions.1 41 The next year, the number of petitions
jumped to just over 17,000. The spike was an expected
consequence of AEDPA's new one-year filing deadline, which
would have closed off access to the district courthouse forever
for state prisoners whose convictions became final before
passage of AEDPA and who did not file within one year of
AEDPA's effective date. 142 More surprising than the one-year
jump, however, has been the fact that the annual number of
habeas filings has remained elevated, never dipping below
15,000 through 2008. See Figure 1, below.
Figure 1. Annual Number of Habeas Petitions Filed
in All Districts
0 18,000
0 17,000
16,000
15,000

5

14,000
13,000

6
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Note: Figure 1 shows the number of state-prisoner federal

habeas petitions initiated nationwide each year by state
prisoners. The jump in filings in 1997 coincides with
AEDPA's new one-year deadline for filing petitions.

141. Unless otherwise noted, all of the statistics cited in the remainder of Parts
II.B and II.C represent conclusions drawn from the descriptive statistical analysis
described in Part II.A, supra.
142. The effective date of AEDPA was April 24, 1996, and the filing deadline
for state prisoners whose convictions were final before that date was one year
later, on April 24, 1997. Carey, 536 U.S. at 216-17.
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That said, while the number of petitions filed annually has
never come close to diminishing to pre-AEDPA levels, the trend
since 2000 has been downward, from 17,610 in that year to
15,704 in 2008.143
The same spike and downward trend holds true with
respect to the average annual number of new habeas filings per
district court judgeship over this period. Figure 2, below, shows
that there has not been a rise in the number of petitions filed
annually per judge, which in theory might have been the case
due to large numbers of judicial vacancies.

Figure 2. Annual Number of Habeas Petitions Filed
per Judgeship in All Districts
30
o 28
26
'-24

S22
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Year

Note: Figure 2 shows the number of annual filings per
district court judgeship nationwide (excluding senior
judges). 144

143. The largest number of petitions (17,610) was filed in 2000. From 2001 to
2003, the annual number of filings ranged from 16,247 to 16,258. From 2004
onward, the number of filings dropped, only once topping 16,000 (in 2006, when
16,015 petitions were filed). The year 2008 saw the second lowest number of
habeas filings (15,488) since 1998, when 15,704 petitions were filed.
144. The number of "active" judgeships is necessarily imprecise, since
vacancies are continuously created and filled over the course of a year. This
estimate is, however, more useful than simply relying on the number of
"authorized" judgeships, since many districts have vacancies authorized that have
remained unfilled for years. The figures used here were derived from
Administrative Office lists of judgeships and of judicial vacancies. The number of
"active" judgeships was calculated by starting with the number of "authorized"
judgeships for a district annually, and subtracting from that number any vacancy
in that district that was reported as of the last day of the fiscal year. Senior judges
and magistrates were not included in the calculation.
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TerminationsAlmost Keep Pace with Filings. One intuitive
way to assess whether the district courts, as a whole, are
keeping up with their habeas caseload is to gauge whether they
are deciding as many cases each year as are being filed. For
reasons discussed below, that kind of assessment paints an
incomplete portrait of the scope and nature of the delay
problem, but it serves as a useful starting point for the
analysis. Viewed from a nationwide perspective, the federal
courts appear-more or less-to have kept pace with new
habeas filings since 1998. See Figure 3, below.
Figure 3. Annual Number of Habeas Petitions Filed
and Decided in All Districts
OFiled MDecided
18,000

. 16,000
S14,000

~12,000
S10,000
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Year
Note: Figure 3 shows the annual number of state-prisoner
federal habeas petitions filed each year and the number of
such petitions terminated each year by the district courts.

In 1997, the number of petitions filed by state prisoners far
outnumbered the number of petitions terminated by the federal
district courts (17,015 filed, compared with 12,820 terminated).
This differential clearly was an artifact of AEDPA's new oneyear filing deadline. Since 1998, however, the courts have been
remarkably consistent in "keeping up" with the new filings
(that is, deciding almost as many cases annually as are
initiated). In every year except 2006, the number of new habeas
filings exceeded the number of district court terminations by no
more than 1,000 petitions, and in four years (1998, 2001, 2003,
and 2004), the district courts actually decided more petitions
than were filed. But, as explained below, the courts are not
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"keeping current" with their habeas dockets, because the
proportion of aging cases is likewise increasing annually.

Number and Percentage of Undecided Cases Increases.
While the district courts seem to be treading water by deciding
roughly as many cases as are filed annually, closer inspection
reveals that an increasing proportion of all cases appearing on
the docket remain undecided each year. The number of
undecided (or "open") cases on the federal courts' dockets
(determined by taking a statistical "snapshot" of the docket as
of the September 30 reporting date for the year) has been
trending upward since 1998. As shown by Figure 4, below, from
1998 to 2001, the number of open petitions ranged from 13,249
(in 1998) to exactly 14,000 (in 2000). From 2002 to 2005, the
number of open cases had increased, ranging from a low of
13,974 (in 2004) to a high of 14,396 (in 2005). And from 2006 to
2008, the number of open cases ranged from a low of 15,461 (in
2006) to a high of 15,875 (in 2007).

Figure 4. Annual Number of Habeas Petitions Filed,
Decided and Open in All Districts
Open
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Note: Figure 4 shows three things: the annual number of
state-prisoner federal habeas petitions filed each year (the
dotted line), the number of petitions terminated each year
by the district courts, and the number of petitions left
undecided on the courts' dockets as of the September 30
reporting date for each year. This figure does not provide
information about the age of the "open" petitions as of the
September 30 reporting date.
Thus, although the federal courts over this period were
deciding nearly as many cases as were being filed annually, the
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number of cases that remained open on their dockets continued
to increase, as did the proportion of undecided cases on the
dockets. Indeed, by 2008, more petitions remained open on the
district courts' dockets than were either filed or terminated in
that year. As Figure 4 shows, although the number of annual
habeas filings has been trending downward, the number of
undecided petitions on the dockets each year has been trending
upward.
Age of Undecided Cases Increases. The mere fact that an
increasing number of habeas petitions remain undecided on
district court dockets as of the end of each fiscal year does not,
in itself, tell us whether the state of the courts' habeas dockets
is healthy. Certainly, the fact that the number of undecided
petitions has increased from 13,249 in 1998, to 14,335 in 2003,
to 15,824 in 2008, suggests that the courts are not, in fact,
keeping up with their habeas caseload. Nonetheless, until we
get a sense of the age of these open petitions, we cannot
determine how serious a problem the courts have. Assume, for
argument's sake, that the filing dates of petitions initiated in
2008 were heavily skewed toward the end of the reporting year.
(Perhaps, for example, 15,000 of the 15,824 "open" petitions
were filed within a month of September 30, 2008, when the
Administrative Office took its statistical snapshot of the courts'
dockets.) On this hypothetical, the average age of the
undecided petitions for 2008 would in fact be quite low, and
might not reflect poorly on the overall health of the district
courts' dockets.
If, however, we found that the open petitions as of
September 30 were on average much older, we might conclude
that the district courts were adept at terminating a significant
proportion of newly filed petitions, but at the same time, were
struggling to dispose of older cases. There might, in other
words, be a real delay problem in the district courts' docket
that remains obscured by the relatively positive filing-totermination ratio.
In fact, the age of the open petitions is rising, and many of
the petitions that remain pending on the district courts'
dockets annually have been there for years. 145 For example,
145. Multiple factors may contribute to the increasing age of open habeas
petitions. For example, because habeas filing rates per judgeship differ across
districts, some of the delay in disposition may be due to high concentrations of
petitions in several "problem" districts. See infra Part II.C. Identifying the full
panoply of reasons for the habeas delay problem is beyond the scope of this
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Figure 5 shows that the number of open petitions on the courts'
dockets (that is, the number of petitions that remained
undecided as of the September 30 reporting date for the fiscal
year) that were at least three years old has trended upward
since 1996, and was more than five times as large in 2008
(1,291 petitions) as in 1996 (only 255 petitions). The nature of
the increase remains dramatic even after we take into account
the surge in filings that resulted from AEDPA's one-year filing
deadline in 1997, which was reflected three years later (in
2000) in the jump in the number of three-year-old undecided
petitions to more than 600.
Figure 5. Annual Number of Open Habeas Petitions
Pending for Three or More Years in All Districts
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Note: Figure 5 shows the number of state-prisoner federal
habeas petitions nationwide that remained open annually
on the courts' dockets and that had been pending for at least
three years as of the September 30 reporting date. The
number of three-year-old petitions remained steady from
1996 to 1999, but jumped markedly in 2000. This increase
in 2000 is an effect we might expect as a result of the spike
in filings three years earlier, in 1997, when the AEDPA oneyear filing deadline expired.

Number of All Cases Pending at Least Three Years
Increases. As of the end of 2008, more than 1,200 habeas
petitions that had been pending for three years or more
Article, but this Article suggests below that a significant factor causing the delay
is the refusal of the federal courts to publicly report on the status of six-month-orolder habeas petitions in the same manner that other civil motions are reported,
pursuant to the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990. See infra Part III.
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remained undecided. But the increasing number of undecided
petitions that have remained on the dockets for at least three
years does not begin to capture the depth of the delay problem,
because an almost equal number of the petitions that are
terminated each year were likewise on the dockets for at least
three years before being decided. As Figure 6 shows, when the
numbers of terminated and open petitions that have been
pending for at least three years are summed, we find a steady
increase in the number of three-year-old petitions-from 558 in
1996, to 1,247 in 2000, to 1,559 in 2004, to 2,460 in 2008. There
has, in short, been an almost five-fold increase since 1996 in
the number of petitions appearing on the courts' dockets that
were aged at least three years.
Figure 6. Annual Number of Habeas Petitions Aged
Three Years or More in All Districts
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Note: Figure 6 shows two things: (1) the number of stateprisoner federal habeas petitions nationwide that were
decided in the fiscal year and that had also been on the
courts' dockets at least three years before decision, and (2)
the full number of all three-year-old petitions that appeared
annually on the courts' dockets (that is, the number of cases
that were decided in the fiscal year plus the number of cases
that remained undecided as of the September 30 reporting
date for each year). By including decided petitions in the
calculation of the number of three-year-old petitions, this
Figure shows that since 2000 there have been at least one
thousand petitions that remained undecided for at least
three years, and that the number of such petitions has
increased markedly since then.
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Just as the number of terminated and open petitions
appearing on the courts' dockets each year that have aged to at
least three years has risen, so has the proportion of such
petitions of all habeas cases appearing on the dockets. As
Figure 7 shows, in 1996 fewer than 3% of all petitions had aged
to at least three years, with that percentage rising to 4% in
2000, more than 5% in 2002, more than 6% in 2006, and nearly
8% in 2008.

Figure 7. Annual Percentage of Habeas Petitions

Aged Three Years or More in All Districts
10
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Note: Figure 7 shows the proportion of state-prisoner
federal habeas petitions nationwide appearing annually on
the courts' dockets (that is, the number of cases that were
terminated in the fiscal year plus the number of cases that
remained undecided as of the September 30 reporting date
for each year) that had been pending for at least three
years. Since 1999, the percentage of petitions three years
old or more has increased from under 3% to nearly 8% in
2008.

Number of One-Year-Old and Two-Year-Old Petitions
Pending Increases. The increasing number of petitions that
take three years or more to decide is large, but these petitions
represent a relatively small (albeit growing) proportion of all
petitions appearing annually on the courts' dockets. 14 6 More
146. A plausible explanation for this population of petitions is that they are on
the dockets for so long because they are particularly knotty cases that,
notwithstanding appropriate judicial attention, simply cannot be resolved quickly.
The evidence discussed in this study is not adequate to draw conclusions about
this hypothesis, but it should be noted that it may well not be valid. In 2003,
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concerning is the growing number of petitions that remain
open for slightly less time, but that still are not being resolved
promptly.
Figure 8 shows that the number of "one-year-old" petitions
on the courts' dockets annually (that is, those pending for at
least a year but less than two years), and the number of "twoyear-old" petitions (that is, those pending for more than two
but less than three years) has been growing at a rapid pace
over the past dozen years. In 1996, there were only about 1,200
two-year-old petitions, but by 2008 there were more than 3,400.
Similarly striking, in 1996 there were just under 3,600 oneyear-old petitions, but by 2008 there were more than 6,400.
The total number of one-year-old and two-year-old petitions
rose from just under 5,000 in 1996 to just under 10,000 in 2008.

Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York agreed to resolve a
500-petition backlog in the district. As of May 9, 2003, when he took control of the
habeas petitions, 170 of the 500 petitions had already been pending for more than
three years. Nonetheless, each of those petitions was resolved, along with the
balance of the 500, by Judge Weinstein by December 2003. See WEINSTEIN
REPORT, supra note 16, at 6.
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Figure 8. Annual Number of Habeas Petitions Aged 12 Years and 2-3 Years in All Districts
10,000

.

01-2YearsOld

*2-3YearsOld

8,000
6,000
4,000

2,000

z

0~v

Year

Note: Figure 8 shows the number of state-prisoner federal
habeas petitions nationwide appearing annually on the
courts' dockets (that is, the number of cases that were
terminated in the fiscal year plus the number of cases that
remained undecided as of the September 30 reporting date
for each year) that remained undecided for one to two years
(more precisely, 365 to 729 days, which I refer to as "oneyear-old" petitions here) and for two-to-three years (730 to
1094 days, which I refer to as "two-year-old" petitions). The
values for each set of petitions are graphed here in a
stacked manner so that the full height of each column
represents the cumulative number of petitions that
remained undecided for between one and three years.
The proportionof cases on the docket that were undecided
for at least one year has likewise increased steadily, as shown
in Figure 9. In 1996, just over one quarter of all cases
appearing on the courts' dockets had been pending at least one
year. By 2000, the proportion of such cases had risen to almost
30%, and by 2008 the proportion was just shy of 40%. Stated
simply, since the passage of AEDPA, the proportion of aging
cases on the docket has grown steadily.
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Figure 9. Annual Percentage of Habeas Petitions
Requiring One Year or More to Decide in All Districts
40
t 35
30

~25
20

Year

Note: Figure 9 shows the percentage of state-prisoner
federal habeas petitions nationwide appearing annually on
the courts' dockets (that is, the number of cases that were
terminated in the fiscal year plus the number of cases that
remained undecided as of the September 30 reporting date
for each year) that remained undecided for at least one year.
In 1997, the proportion of such cases fell below 25%, in part
because of the huge spike in the filing of habeas petitions
that year that corresponded to AEDPA's filing deadline. (By
definition, none of the petitions filed in that year could have
been pending for at least one year as of September 30,
1997.) The number of petitions requiring at least one year to
terminate rose steadily thereafter, from about 30% in 2000
to almost 40% in 2008.

Proportionof Petitions Decided in Less Than Six Months
Plummets. Another measure of the relative health of the
district courts' habeas dockets is the proportion of petitions
appearing annually on the dockets that are aged less than six
months. As Figure 10 shows, in 1996, almost exactly half of the
petitions remained open on the courts' dockets for less than six
months. In 1997, the proportion of such petitions jumped to
56.2%. On first glance, 1997 looks like it was an efficient one
for the district courts. Upon reflection though, we can see that
the reason for the high proportion of petitions aged less than
six months is not that the courts were deciding more petitions
promptly, but rather, that the huge number of petitions filed in
the latter half of 1997 (as a consequence of the April 24, 1997
filing deadline for prisoners whose convictions became final
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before the effective date of AEDPA) had by and large not been
on the dockets long enough to have aged to six months.
By 1998, when one would first expect to see the effects of
the AEDPA filing deadline on the age of undecided petitions,
there were significantly more petitions remaining on the
dockets for six months or more (53.7%) than for less than six
months (46.3%). The proportion of petitions pending for six
months or more trends upwards thereafter, reaching 54.1% in
2001, 56.5% in 2004, and 59.4% in 2008. These numbers are of
particular interest if we assume, as this Article suggests we
should, that six months is a presumptively reasonable amount
of time for a district court to take to resolve a state-prisoner
habeas application.14 7
Figure 10. Proportion of Habeas Petitions Pending
Less than Six Months and Six Months or More in All
Districts
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Note: Figure 10 shows the proportion of state-prisoner
federal habeas petitions nationwide appearing annually on
the courts' dockets (that is, the number of cases that were
terminated in the fiscal year plus the number of cases that
remained undecided as of the September 30 reporting date
for each year) that remained on the dockets for less than six
months, and the number of such petitions that remained on
the dockets at least six months. In 1996, roughly half the
petitions appearing on the docket had aged to six months or
more. By 1998, when we would first expect to see the effect
of the 1997 AEDPA filing deadline that had led to a jump in
the number of habeas filings that year, 54% of the petitions
had been pending for six months or more. The proportion of

147.

See infra Part III.
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cases that remained undecided on the courts' dockets
increased steadily from 2000 (52%) to 2008 (59.4%).

National Disposition Times Show Many Petitions Decided
Quickly, but Many Require Years. A final measure of the health
of the federal district courts' habeas dockets is the distribution
of the actual disposition time of petitions. On the positive side,
Figure 11 shows that for all petitions initiated between fiscal
years 1997 and 2006, fully 10% were terminated within 15 days
of filing, and 25% within 61 days, with a median disposition
time for all petitions of 197 days, or just over six months. The
federal courts, in other words, dispatched a great many of the
petitions filed over this decade relatively promptly. More
problematic, though, are the numbers on the other side of the
chart. Only 75% of the petitions were terminated within 435
days of filing, and fully 10% remained pending for more than
868 days (or about 2.4 years).
Figure 11. Pendency Times for Habeas Petitions
Filed in All Districts from 1997 to 2006, by Percentile
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Note: Figure 11 shows by percentile the number of days that

all state-prisoner federal habeas petitions filed between
fiscal years 1997 and 2006 remained pending before
termination. The fastest 10% of petitions were decided
within 15 days, half of the petitions were terminated within
197 days, and 90% of the petitions were terminated within
868 days (which means that 10% of the petitions filed
during this period required at least 2.3 years to be decided).
Summary. This review of all of the state-prisoner habeas
petitions that appeared on the district courts' dockets from
1996 to 2008 establishes that a large and increasing number of
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petitions remain undecided for a very long time. The number of
undecided petitions as of the end of each reporting year, for
example, has increased from 9,086 in 1996 to 15,824 in 2008.
The proportion of petitions that remain pending for lengthy
periods before decision has likewise increased substantially
during this time period. As of 2008, fully 39.4% of petitions
required at least one year for decision, compared with only
25.7% in 2006. The proportion of petitions requiring at least
two years for decision more than doubled during this time
period, increasing from 8.5% of petitions in 1995 to 18.7% in
2008. And the proportion of petitions requiring at least three
years to decide increased more than threefold, from 2.7% in
1996 to 7.8% in 2008.
C. Habeas Delay Districtby District
The national statistics reveal that, even though the
number of new habeas filings (and the number of new habeas
filings per judge) has been trending downward since 2000, an
increasing number and percentage of cases remain undecided
on the district courts' dockets for years. While the observations
from the previous Section therefore show that there is in fact a
serious habeas delay problem, closer scrutiny of the dockets
district by district reveals that the problem is much more
pronounced in individual districts. As is shown below, all other
things being equal, the amount of time that a petitioner's
habeas application will remain pending without decision
depends upon the district in which he files his petition (which,
in turn, is generally determined by the district in which he is
incarcerated). 148
Sharp Differences by District in Mean and Median Number
of Days Habeas Petitions Remain Undecided. For habeas
petitions that were filed between 1997 and 2006, the mean
amount of time that they remained pending (either until
decision, or until September 30, 2008, if they had not been
decided by that date) was 325 days nationwide, with a median
of 197 days. As Figure 12 reveals, however, the mean and
148. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) (2006) (petitioner serving a state criminal
sentence in a state containing more than one federal district may file a habeas
petition not only "in the district court for the district wherein [he] is in custody,"
but also "in the district court for the district within which the State court was
held which convicted and sentenced him"); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426,
442-44 (2004) (discussing proper jurisdiction for filing habeas challenges).
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median days pending for petitions was not uniform by district.
The mean number of days that petitions remained open in the
"slowest" ten districts-as measured by the mean number of
days pending until decision-ranged from 451 days (in the
Northern District of West Virginia) to 669 days (in the Western
District of New York). The median processing times in these
"slowest" ten districts was likewise much longer, ranging from
330 days (in the District of Massachusetts) to 686 days (in the
Eastern District of Missouri).
In contrast, the ten "fastest" districts had mean processing
times considerably below the national average--ranging from
193 days (in the Western District of Missouri) to a low of 106
days (in the Western District of Virginia). Medians for these
"fastest" districts ranged from 143 days (in the Eastern District
of Virginia) to just 28 days (again, in the Western District of

Virginia). 14 9

149. The Virginia districts' low disposition time for resolving state-prisoner
habeas matters is consistent with its overall efficiency in civil matters. See Carrie
E. Johnson, Rocket Dockets: Reducing Delay in Federal Civil Litigation, 85 CALIF.
L. REV. 225, 233 (1997).
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Figure 12. Median and Mean Number of Days Pending for
Habeas Petitions Filed from 1997 to 2006 by District
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Note: Figure 12 shows the median and mean number of
days pending, by district, for the 163,443 state-prisoner
federal habeas petitions filed from 1997 to 2006. Districts
with fewer than 100 petitions filed during this period have
been excluded.

District in Which Petition is Filed Appears to Determine
How Long the Petition Will Remain Pending. There is wide
variation among the districts in the number of petitions that
are decided promptly, whether measured by the number
decided within six months or within one year of filing.
Unsurprisingly, the "slowest" districts have a smaller
proportion of petitions pending for under six months than do
the "fastest" districts. Figure 13 includes data for the ten
districts with the highest mean number of days pending for
habeas petitions; it shows the total number of petitions filed
between 1997 and 2006 that were pending: (1) for less than six
months, and (2) for six months or more. Figure 14 shows the
same information for the ten districts with the lowest mean
number of days pending. 5 0

150. There is a statistically significant positive correlation between the mean
number of habeas filings per judge per year in a district and the mean disposition
times for the petitions. See infra Figure 18 and accompanying text.

ill
0
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Figure 13. Number of Habeas Petitions Decided in
Less than Six Months and in Six Months or More, for
Districts with Highest Mean Days Pending
5,000
4,000

0

3,000

0

DLess Than Six Months

MSix Months or More

2,000

0

2 1,000

z

U

F

e

?

9
0

,, 9

9

41
1 01Q
..

. 'q

District

Figure 14. Number of Habeas Petitions Decided in
Less than Six Months and in Six Months or More, for
Districts with Lowest Mean Days Pending
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Note: Figures 13 and 14 show the number of state-prisoner
federal habeas petitions (filed between fiscal years 1997 and
2006) terminated in less than six months and the number of
such petitions that remained open for six months or more,
for the ten slowest districts (those with the highest mean
days pending per petition) and for the ten fastest districts
(those with the lowest mean days pending per petition),
respectively. Without exception, the fast districts resolve
more habeas petitions in less than six months than in six
months or more, while the opposite holds true for the
slowest districts.
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Taken together, what is most striking about these figures
is that none of the "slowest" districts had more petitions
decided in less than six months than in six months or more,
while the opposite holds true in the "fastest" districts. Figure
15 highlights this difference by expressing this same
information proportionally. For the "fastest" districts, the
proportion of petitions requiring less than six months to
terminate ranged from 57% (in the Eastern District of Virginia)
to 81% (in the District of Maine). In contrast, for the "slowest"
districts, the range was from 41% (in the Northern District of
New York) to only 22% (in the Northern District of Oklahoma).
Figure 15. Proportion of Habeas Petitions Filed from
1997 to 2006 and Decided in Less than Six Months in
the Fastest and Slowest Districts
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Note: Figure 15 shows the percentage of state-prisoner
federal habeas petitions (filed between 1997 and 2006)
terminated in less than six months for the ten fastest
districts (those with the lowest mean days pending per
petition) and for the ten slowest districts (those with the
highest mean days pending per petition).

The same pattern can be seen for the number and
proportion of petitions that require at least one year until
termination, though in this regard, the differences between the
"fastest" and "slowest" districts are even more pronounced.
Figure 16 shows that in each of the ten "fastest" districts, fewer
than 20% of the petitions filed between 1997 and 2006 required
more than one year to be decided. In fact, for the ten "fastest"
districts, the proportion of petitions requiring more than one
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year ranged from just 16% (in the Western District of Missouri)
to as low as 3% (in the District of Maine). In contrast, for the
ten "slowest" districts, the proportion of petitions requiring
more than one year for decision was drastically higher, ranging
from 46% (in the District of Massachusetts) to 61% (in the
Northern District of Oklahoma).

Figure 16. Proportion of Habeas Petitions Filed from
1997 to 2006 and Open for at Least One Year in the
Fastest and Slowest Districts
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Note: Figure 16 shows the percentage of state-prisoner
federal habeas petitions (filed between fiscal years 1997 and
2006) requiring at least one year before termination for the
ten fastest districts (those with the lowest mean days
pending per petition) and for the ten slowest districts (those
with the highest mean days pending per petition).
In addition (though it is not shown in any of these figures),
the proportion of petitions requiring at least three years to be
decided in the "slowest" districts ranged from 9% (in the
District of Massachusetts) to 29% (in the Northern District of
Oklahoma). For four of the ten "slowest" districts, at least 25%
of all petitions appearing on their dockets required at least
three years to be decided.

Statistical Significance of Differences in Disposition Times
Among Grouped Districts. Although the discussion up to this
point has been primarily descriptive in nature, as a predictive
matter, there is in fact a statistically significant positive
correlation between the district in which a petition is filed and
the number of days that it is likely to remain pending on the
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district court's docket. Figure 17, below, divides the universe of
all petitions that were filed between 1997 and 2006 into three
groups: The first group includes petitions filed in the ten
"fastest" districts (by mean number of days pending); the
second includes petitions filed in the ten "slowest" districts; and
the third includes petitions filed in the "average" districts
(which includes all districts that are in neither the "fastest" nor
the "slowest" categories).151 Figure 17 shows the likelihood that
a petition filed in one of these groups will remain open at any
point in time. 152 For example, the median amount of time that
a petition filed in one of the ten "fastest" districts is about three
months (94 days), the median in one of the "average" districts
is more than double that (190 days), and the median in one of
the "slowest" districts doubles that again, to more than a year
(374 days).1 53

151. Districts in which fewer than one hundred petitions were filed between
1997 and 2006 were excluded from the analysis.
152. The analysis was performed using the Cox Proportional Hazard method.
153. The difference among each of these categories ("fastest," "slowest," and
"average") is statistically significant, with a p-value of <.0001.
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Figure 17. Probability That Habeas Petitions Filed
from 1997 to 2006 in Fast, Average, and Slow Districts
Will Remain Undecided After Set Period of Days
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Note: Figure 17 shows the "survival probability" for habeas
petitions filed in the ten fastest districts by mean
disposition time (see Figure 14), in the ten slowest districts
(see Figure 13), and in the "average" districts (that is,
districts that are among neither the fastest nor the slowest).
The probability indicated by the y-axis is that a petition will
remain undecided. The calculations were made using the
Cox Proportional Hazard Model, with the number of days
pending used as the response variable, and the average
number of filings per judge per year and the district
category (fastest, average, and slowest) used as independent
variables. The differences among all groups (fastest-slowest,
fastest-average, and average-slowest) were statistically
significant, with p-value of <.0001 for each.
A comparison of the "fastest," "slowest," and "average"
groups shows that the likelihood that a petition that is filed in
one of those districts will be decided within any given period of
time varies markedly and significantly by group. Table 1
shows, for example, that for the "fastest" districts, fully 68.2%
of petitions are decided within six months, while 48.3% of
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petitions in the "average" districts are decided that quickly,
and only 29.9% of petitions in the "slowest" districts are
terminated within that time frame. Similarly, the likelihood
that a petition will be decided within two years of filing is
97.8% in the "fastest" districts, 89.3% in "average" districts,
and only 69.2% in the "slowest"districts.
Table 1. Likelihood That a Habeas
Petition Will Be Decided Within Set
Number of Days, by Category of
District
District

6 Months

1 Year

2 Years

3 Years

Fastest

68.2

88.7

97.8

99.6

Average

48.3

71.5

89.3

95.7

Slowest

29.9

49.2

69.2

81.6

Note: The information set out in Table 1 and in Table 2,
below, is the same as that shown in graphic form in Figure
17.

Table 2 tells the same story in slightly different form. For
example, 90% of habeas petitions that are filed in one of the
"fastest" districts will be decided within 387 days, but it will
take more than double that (779 days) for 90% of the petitions
in an "average" district to be decided, and fully 1,337 days to
reach that percentage in the "slowest" districts. Similarly, in
the "fastest" districts, one quarter of all petitions are decided
within a month (28 days) while in the "average" districts it
takes nearly two months (59 days) to reach this percentage,
and in the slowest districts it takes more than four months
(139 days).
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Table 2. Expected Number of Days
Until Decision for a Habeas Petition
Filed in Each Category of District,
by Percentile
District

10th

25th

50th

75th

90th

Fastest

7

28

94

225

387

Average

14

59

190

405

779

Slowest

35

139

374

896

1337

In fact, the likelihood that a habeas petition will be decided
within a set number of days is 3.2 times higher for a petition
filed in one of the "fastest" districts than for a petition filed in
one of the "slowest" districts; it is 1.7 times higher for a petition
filed in one of the fastest districts than for a petition filed in
one of the "average" districts. A petition filed in an "average"
district is 1.8 times more likely to be decided by any given date
than a petition filed in one of the "slowest" districts.
Age of Petitions is Correlated with Density of Filings in
District. Districts with the highest mean number of habeas
filings per judge per year might be expected to have the highest
mean disposition times for those petitions. In the case of the
Eastern District of California, this common sense expectation
turns out to be true. From 1997 to 2006, the district had by far
the highest mean number of filings per judge annually-an
astonishing 125 per judge, which is fully 100 petitions per year
per judge more than the 25-petition median for districts
nationwide. Unsurprisingly, the Eastern District of California
was also among the ten "slowest" districts, as measured by
mean processing time. See Figure 18, below, showing the
fifteen districts with the highest mean number of habeas
petitions filed annually per judge for this period.
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Figure 18. Districts with Highest Mean Number of
Habeas Petitions Filed Annually from 1997 to 2006
to) 0140

Worst

per Judge

120
100
80

60

Best Best

Best Best

S40

200

District

Note: Figure 18 shows the mean number of habeas petitions
filed per judgeship annually between 1997 and 2006 for the
fifteen districts with the highest such mean. The label
"Worst" denotes a district that is among the ten districts
with the slowest mean processing times for habeas
petitions; the label "Best" denotes a district that is among
the ten fastest. Of the fifteen districts with the highest
number of petitions filed per judgeship, only one (the
Eastern District of California) is also among the districts
with the worst processing times for habeas petitions, while
four (the Western District of Missouri, the Southern District
of Texas, the Western District of Virginia, and the Eastern
District of Virginia) are among the ten districts with the
best mean processing times.
That said, Figure 18 also reveals that, of the remaining
districts with the highest mean number of new habeas filings
per judge, none of them are also among the ten "slowest"
districts by mean processing time. Moreover, four of the
districts with the highest mean number of habeas filings
annually per judge (Western District of Missouri, Southern
District of Texas, Western District of Virginia, and Eastern
District of Virginia) were among the ten "fastest" districts by
mean processing time. Still, notwithstanding the success of
these high-density districts in resolving habeas petitions
quickly, regression analysis shows that the average number of
filings per judge per year is a statistically significant indicator
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of the number of days that a petition is likely to remain
pending.154
Summary. This Section has shown that the scope of the
habeas delay problem nationwide is not distributed uniformly
across judicial districts; in some districts the delay is quite
profound, and in others it is not. While filing rates and the
number of judges in each district provides some explanation for
the delay, many of the districts with the highest ratio of filings
per judgeship have processed their habeas caseloads with the
best efficiency in the country. It is beyond the scope of this
Article to identify the reasons for the differences in processing
times across districts, but the mere fact of the disparities
establishes that for state prisoners who unluckily must file in
one of the least efficient districts, the likelihood of having their
petitions decided in a reasonable period of time is astonishingly
slim.
III. PUBLIC REPORTING AND THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT

While there is no panacea for relieving the habeas delay
problem detailed in Part 11,155 the following Sections offer a
simple proposal for improving the disposition rate of habeas
petitions: require federal court judges to produce semi-annual,
easily-accessible, public reports that identify by name and case
number all state-prisoner habeas petitions that have been
pending in their chambers for six months or more. The purpose
of such a requirement would be to hold judges accountable to
the public (and to their fellow judges) for the state of their
habeas dockets, and to incentivize them to reach decisions on
their habeas petitions more expeditiously.
The proposal is simple and straightforward. In fact, federal
district court judges already must supply exactly this
information for all other civil motions that have been pending

154. The p-value was <.0001, meaning that the annual number of habeas
filings per judge is a statistically significant indicator of the length of time that a
petition will remain pending.
155. Such an effort would surely be quixotic. Although "[1]iterally hundreds of
articles have been written since the early part of this century that directly or
indirectly address court delay," JOHN GOERDT ET AL., EXAMINING COURT DELAY:
THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN 26 URBAN TRIAL COURTS, 1987, at 3 (1989), civil
matter processing times remain less than ideal. See, e.g., IAALS STUDY, supra
note 3, at 38 tbl.4 (providing distribution of cases by overall time from filing to
disposition for sample of about 7,700 federal civil matters-excluding prisoner
petitions-that were terminated in 2006).
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for six months or more on their dockets as of the semi-annual
reporting dates. A fair reading of the federal statute that sets
out this requirement-section 476 of the CJRA 156-would seem
to mandate that the status of undecided habeas petitions be
treated in like manner. However, the Judicial Conference and
the Administrative Office, as the bodies responsible for
implementing section 476, have thus far interpreted the
provision to exempt habeas petitions.
The result of the combination of the CJRA reporting
requirement and the Judicial Conference's exemption of habeas
from its ambit is that judges are encouraged to promptly decide
motions in every type of civil case except habeas. Indeed, the
perverse effect of exempting habeas petitions is that judges are
more likely to leave such petitions unexamined, at least while
other civil motions that will be imminently reportable remain
on the docket. Reinterpreting section 476 of the CJRA to
require public reporting on habeas motions that remain
undecided for at least six months would remove the
disincentive that judges now have to decide habeas cases
promptly.157 Of course, there will be a corresponding cost:
Disposition times for non-habeas civil matters may be affected
if district court judges are no longer incentivized to turn to
them first before habeas matters. 158
The first Section below reviews the history of the CJRA
reporting requirement, and notes the general consensus that it
has been successful in reducing some of the delay in civil cases
in the federal courts. The second Section discusses the Judicial
Conference's decision not to include habeas petitions among the
motions reportable under the CJRA, and suggests that a more
faithful construction of the statute would not exempt habeas
156. 28 U.S.C. § 476 (2006).
157. This observation should not be understood to suggest that current
interpretations of the CJRA reporting requirement are the sole explanation for
the increasing habeas delay problem. Other factors might include any number of
the following: an increasing federal criminal caseload, which must be given
priority by judges pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act; the increased complexity of,
and time commitment needed to resolve, other civil matters; a high judicial
vacancy rate; understaffing in states' Attorney General offices, and a concomitant
difficulty in filing timely responses to prisoner petitions; the arguably difficult
nature of habeas decision making itself, which since the passage of AEDPA has
required judges to apply increasingly complex rules; and the near-total lack of
lawyers to assist habeas petitioners and prod judges to reach decisions promptly.
158. Of course, that is precisely the result envisioned by 28 U.S.C. § 1657,
which requires the district courts to expedite habeas applications. See supra Part

I.C.
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petitions. The final Section applies the results of this Article's
analysis of Administrative Office data and provides a
normative argument encouraging the Judicial Conference to
revisit its interpretation of the CJRA's reporting requirement,
so that habeas petitioners are not made to suffer
disproportionately for the district courts' heavy civil caseloads.
A.

The CJRA and Its Reporting Requirement

The CJRA grew out of a broad consensus in the legal
community that "civil litigation costs too much and takes too
long." 59 In 1989, at the behest of then-Senator Joseph Biden, a
task force from the Brookings Institution, a nonprofit public
Congress a series of
policy think tank, offered
recommendations for reducing inefficiencies and inequities in
federal civil litigation, including having judges take a more
active role in managing their caseloads and by requiring each
district court to develop its own "Civil Justice Reform Plan."1 60
These plans would mandate, among other things, "tracking"
cases by degree of difficulty, scheduling conferences, setting
early and firm trial dates for all cases, providing firm time
guidelines for discovery, and devising "procedures for resolving
motions quickly."'61 The CJRA as a whole was envisioned to be
a "civil analogue to the federal Speedy Trial Act."1 62
Brookings also found relatively broad support in the legal
community for "increasing judicial accountability" by
publicizing court dockets. 163 Brookings therefore also
recommended that judges be required to submit quarterly
reports of all pending submitted motions that had remained
unresolved after thirty, sixty, and ninety days, "and all
succeeding 30-day increments" thereafter.164 Interest groups
159. BROOKINGS INST., JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL
LITIGATION 1 (1989).

160. Id. at 3.
161. Id. See generally Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Congress and the Courts: Our
Mutual Obligation, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1285, 1290-94 (1994) (discussing the origins
of the CJRA).
162. Edward D. Cavanagh, The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the 1993
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Can Systemic Ills Afflicting
the Federal Courts Be Remedied by Local Rules?, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 721, 724
(1993).
163. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the JudicialImprovements Act of
1990: Hearings on S. 2027 and S. 2648 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong. 159 (1990) [hereinafter Hearingson S. 2027 and S. 2648].
164. BROOKINGS INST., supra note 159, at 27.
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like Public Citizen backed the reporting proposal, and
suggested the reports would be even more valuable if they were
to include case identification information and the identity of
the judges whose motions remained pending. 165
The federal judiciary launched a strong lobbying effort
against the entire CJRA project. Among other concerns, the
judges expressed initial skepticism about the proposed
reporting requirement of section 476. In testimony before a
House subcommittee, for example, Judge Robert F. Peckham (a
respected jurist and former Chief Judge for the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California) noted
"the unfortunate implications of the title" of the section. 166 The
title, "Enhancement of judicial accountability through
information dissemination," suggested to Judge Peckham that
the legislature believed there was a "shortfall in judicial
accountability and that it is sufficiently significant to warrant
being highlighted and addressed in a federal statute."1 67 (The
title of the section would later be changed.) On the substance of
the proposal, Judge Peckham suggested that his colleagues on
the bench were concerned about the effect that "artificial
deadlines" would have on "the quality of judicial work and on
the morale of the conscientious." 168
The CJRA as a whole was passed in 1990, in much the
same form as recommended by Brookings.169 The final version
of the Act included the reporting requirement, though it
mandated only semi-annual rather than quarterly reports. 170
165. See Hearings on S. 2027 and S. 2648, supra note 163, at 474-77 (letter
from Alan B. Morrison, Public Citizen Litigation Group). This modification would
eventually be included in the statute, providing the first formal way to hold judges
publicly accountable for the management of their caseloads. Katherine J. Henry,
Judicial Discipline Through the Civil Justice Reform Act's Data Collection and
Dissemination Requirements, 1 RES. PAPERS OF THE NAT'L COMMISSION ON JUD.
DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL 859, 859 (1993).

166. Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act and Civil Justice
Reform Act: Hearingon H.R. 5381 and H.R. 3898 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Intellectual Prop., & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong. 133 (1990) (statement of the Hon. Robert F. Peckham).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 134.
169. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, tit. I, 103(a), Pub. L. No. 101-650,
104 Stat. 5089, 5090-98 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994)).
Absent congressional reauthorization, the CJRA was designed to sunset in 1997.
See id. at 5096 ("[The] requirements set forth in [the CJRA] . . . shall remain in
effect for seven years after the date of the enactment of this title [December 1,
1990].").
170. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-732, at 8 (1990) (concluding that "periodic
assessment of docket conditions" would ensure "continuous renewal of the
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As enacted, section 476 of the CJRA (now re-titled
"Enhancement of Judicial Information Dissemination")
required that the Director of the Administrative Office:
prepare a semiannual report, available to the public, that
discloses for each judicial officer-(1) the number of motions
that have been pending for more than six months and the
name of each case in which such motion has been pending;
(2) the number of bench trials that have been submitted for
more than six months and the name of each case in which
such trials are under submission; and (3) the number and
names of cases that have not been terminated within three
years after filing. 17 1
After seven years of living with the CJRA experiment,
judges and practitioners were skeptical about its benefits. In
1996, the RAND Corporation-a nonprofit think tank-was
asked by the Administrative Office and the Judicial Conference
to evaluate the implementation and effectiveness of the case
management reforms the Act had required.172 The RAND study
gave mixed marks to the programs, concluding that for the
most part the reforms "had little effect on time to disposition,
litigation costs, and attorneys' satisfaction and views of the
fairness of case management."1 7 3 According to a commentator,
experience with the CJRA had confirmed the "unvarnished
truth" that "we have no idea how to make a substantial dent in
either cost or delay." 174
The RAND analysis also found, however, that the
reporting requirement may have worked. 175 Others similarly
observed that while most provisions of the CJRA had been
"somewhat disappointing," the "publication requirement seems
commitment to reduce . . . delays"); see also Gordon Hunter, Judges Clog Federal
Docket, TEX. LAW., Nov. 18, 1991, at 1 (quoting senior aide to Senate Judiciary
Committee as calling public disclosure " 'an incentive [for judges] to work a little
faster' and enhance their accountability").
171. 28 U.S.C. § 476(a) (2006).
172. JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND CORP., JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEFFECTIVE?
AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM ACT 1 (1996) [hereinafter RAND STUDY].
173. Id.

174. Paul Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 61 (1997).
175. See RAND STUDY, supra note 172, at 24 (noting that the "number of cases
pending more than three years has dropped by about twenty-five percent from its
pre-CJRA level," and concluding, in the absence of other explanations for the
drop, that the CJRA reporting requirement may have been responsible); IAALS
STUDY, supra note 3, at 77-78; Jeffrey J. Connaughton, Judicial Accountability
and the CJRA, 49 ALA. L. REV. 251, 253 (1997).
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to have resulted in the clearest reduction in case delays."176
Even the Judicial Conference agreed that the statistical
reporting of cases had been useful, acknowledging there was
evidence that case processing times had dropped as a result of
public reporting on the state of the judges' dockets. 177 The
Judicial Conference therefore planned to continue with its
statistical reporting even after the provisions of section 476
had expired178 along with the rest of the CJRA provisions. 179
This independent action turned out to be unnecessary,
however, because Congress reauthorized the reporting
requirement of section 476 in December 1997, even as it
allowed the balance of the CJRA provisions to expire.1 80
Recent scholarship suggests that the CJRA reporting
requirement continues to influence the behavior of judges. The
Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System
(IAALS), for example, sampled 7,700 federal civil cases and
noted a significant increase in the rate of decision on motions
within two weeks before the semi-annual CJRA reporting
deadlines. 181 The decision rate during those two weeks ranged
from 11% to 15%, when the predicted decision rate was only
8.5%.182 In addition, the IAALS study found that 35% to 40% of
the motions that were decided in the two weeks before a CJRA
reporting deadline would have gone on the judges' section 476
reporting list if they had not been decided when they were. 183
The authors concluded from these observations that there was
"strong circumstantial evidence that judges rush to complete
176. Robert E. Litan, Foreword to HON. DANIEL B. WINSLOW, JUSTICE
DELAYED: IMPROVING THE ADMINISTRATION OF CIVIL JUSTICE IN THE
MASSACHUSETTS DISTRICT AND SUPERIOR COURTS (1998).
177. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, THE CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM ACT OF 1990, FINAL REPORT 10, 18 (1997) [hereinafter JUDICIAL

CONFERENCE, FINAL REPORT]. See also Charles Gardner Geyh, Adverse Publicity
as a Means of Reducing Judicial Decision-Making Delay: PeriodicDisclosure of
PendingMotions, Bench Trials and Cases Under the Civil Justice Reform Act, 41
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 511, 533 (1993) (noting a seven percent decline in the number of
motions pending more than six months during the first and second CJRA
reporting periods).
178.
179.

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 177, at 19.
See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, tit. I, 103(a), Pub. L. No. 101-650,

104 Stat. 5089 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994)) (describing
the sunset provisions of the CJRA).
180. See Act of Oct. 6, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-53, § 2, 111 Stat. 1173, 1173 ("The
requirements set forth in section 476 of title 28, United States Code, as added by
subsection (a), shall remain in effect permanently.").
181. IAALS STUDY, supra note 3, at 8.
182.
183.

Id.
Id.
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rulings on motions immediately prior to those reporting
deadlines."1 84
B. HabeasMotions Excluded from Reporting Requirement
However, section 476 has not helped speed the disposition
of habeas applications. The Judicial Conference and the
Administrative Office have advised district court judges that a
habeas petition, even though it is a request for a judge to issue
an order, need not be considered a "motion" for purposes of the
CJRA reporting requirement. 185 Judges do not, in other words,
have to include on their published lists of undecided motions
habeas petitions that have been pending for at least six months
as of the semi-annual CJRA reporting date. And, of course,
judges accordingly do not report this information. 186
This interpretation of section 476 does not seem consistent
with the language and purpose of the provision, nor is it
consistent with the habeas-priority requirements of 28 U.S.C. §
1659. To be sure, responsibility for implementing the section
476 reporting requirement lies with the Judicial Conference
and the Administrative Office. The CJRA authorizes the
Director of the Administrative Office to prescribe standards for
categorizing or characterizing judicial actions for recording
purposes,187 including "a definition of what constitutes a
184. Id. at 8, 78, 79 tbl.31. The authors excluded prisoner suits (including
habeas petitions) from their study. See id. at 23.
185. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE, POLICY GUIDE, supra note 38; JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 46 (1991) (noting that the

Committee on Court Administration and Case Management defined "motions
pending," "bench trials submitted," and "three-year-old cases" for CJRA reporting
purposes). The Judicial Conference has offered no public explanation of its
rationale for exempting habeas applications from the CJRA's six-month reporting
requirements.
186. However, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 476(a)(3) (2006), judges must report
habeas petitions that are at least three years old. In addition, the Judicial
Conference requires judges to report on "secondary" habeas motions (that is,
motions besides the habeas application itself) that have been pending for more
than six months.
187. See 28 U.S.C. § 476(b) (stating that "[t]o ensure uniformity of reporting,
the standards for categorization or characterization of judicial actions to be
prescribed in accordance with section 481 of this title shall apply to the
semiannual report prepared under subsection (a)"); 28 U.S.C. § 481(b)(1) ("In
carrying out subsection (a), the Director shall prescribe-(A) the information to be
recorded in district court automated systems; and (B) standards for uniform
categorization or characterization of judicial actions for the purpose of recording
information on judicial actions in the district court automated systems.").
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dismissal of a case and standards for measuring the period for
which a motion has been pending." 88 In addition, the Judicial
Conference is statutorily authorized to supervise the
administration of the federal courts. 189 As a practical matter,
therefore, the Administrative Office will have the last word on
which aged "motions" must be reported by district courts. That
said, it is not immediately clear how much deference should be
owed to these bodies. As an entity within the judicial branch,
the Administrative Office is not an "administrative agency" for
Chevron deference purposes. 190 Nonetheless, Congress has
charged it with administering the CJRA, and accordingly, it
seems appropriate to recognize a kind of quasi-Chevron
deference for the Administrative Office's construction of the
statute. 191

The reasonableness of the Judicial Conference and the
Administrative Office's exemption of habeas petitions from the
"motions" reporting requirement seems, at any rate,
questionable. A state-prisoner habeas petition (which is
referred to as an "application" in section 2254) is a request to
the district court for an order (usually release from custody). 192
As such, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would
characterize a habeas application as a "motion" rather than a

188. 28 U.S.C. § 481(b)(2) (2006).
189. Id. § 331.
190. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-44 (1984) (holding courts must defer to agency's interpretation of statute);
Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 742 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that the "views
of the Administrative Office are not entitled to the deference of an administrative
agency charged with administering a statute," even though its opinion could be
helpful as an indication of the practice of the federal courts); Litton Sys., Inc. v.
AT&T Co., 568 F. Supp. 507, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("Although the views of the
Administrative Office are not entitled to the deference normally given to those of
an administrative agency interpreting either its own regulations or a statute
which it is charged with administering, its opinion is, nevertheless, that of a
government body that has considered the issue and reached a conclusion
consistent with this Court's result.").
191. Cf. Mills v. United States, 547 F. Supp. 116, 119-20 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ("The
approach taken by the Administrative Office is especially significant because the
United States Supreme Court repeatedly has stated that when a question of
statutory construction arises great deference should be given to how the statute is
interpreted by the officers or agents charged with its administration. . . . Since
this court has found no compelling indications that [the Director of the
Administrative Office's] interpretation [of the Criminal Justice Act] is wrong, due
deference must be given to such an administrative determination.").
192. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), (b), (d), (e) (referring to an "application for a writ
of habeas corpus").
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"pleading."l 93 The Supreme Court, too, has observed that the
"term 'motion' generally means '[a]n application made to a
court or judge for purpose of obtaining a rule or order directing
some act to be done in favor of the applicant.' "194 In fact,
petitions brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (the analogue to
section 2254 petitions for federal prisoners) are referred to as
"motions" within the statute, 195 but are likewise exempted by
the Judicial Conference from treatment as "motions" for CJRA
reporting purposes.
Whether or not deference is appropriate, it is clearly
within the power of the Judicial Conference and the
Administrative Office to revisit the question of what counts as
a "motion" and to assure that habeas applications are treated
in the same way as other motions. Indeed, there is precedent
for the Judicial Conference to do just that. The Judicial
Conference initially exempted both social security and
bankruptcy appeals from the section 476 reporting
requirement, but subsequently reconsidered its position. For
bankruptcy appeals, it explained that "[r]equir[ing] that all
bankruptcy appeals pending over six months in the district
courts be included in the [CJRA] reports" would "assist in
directing judges' attention to bankruptcy appeals and avoid
undue delays."1 96 For social security cases, the Judicial
Conference similarly concluded that a change from past
practice was appropriate because "including social security
appeals in public reports may encourage courts to remain
attentive to their prompt disposition."1 97 Precisely the same
reasoning should be adopted by the Judicial Conference for
habeas petitions.

193. See FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a)-(b) (distinguishing between a pleading-which
includes only forms of a complaint, answer, or reply-and a motion, which is a
"request for a court order").
194. Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 126 (1996) (emphasis added)
(quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1013 (6th ed. 1990)); see also In re Vogel Van
& Storage, Inc., 59 F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1995) ("A motion is an application for an
order.").
195. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (stating that a federal prisoner "may move
the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence")
(emphasis added); id. § 2255(c) ("A court may entertain and determine such
motion without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing.")
(emphasis added).
196. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (1998).
197. Id. at 63.
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Because habeas petitions are not treated as "motions" for
section 476 reporting purposes, there is no incentive for the
district courts to decide them before other civil motions. To the
contrary, by exempting habeas applications from the reporting
requirement, the practical effect is to encourage judges to turn
to aging motions in every other type of civil matter first. This is
a perverse result for a category of cases that by statute is
supposed to receive expedited treatment. 198
C. Proposalto Include Habeas in Reporting Requirement
As a matter of policy, the Judicial Conference should
reconsider its interpretation of section 476 and include habeas
petitions among the courts' reportable motions. As presently
construed by the Judicial Conference, the provision actually
provides a disincentive for judges to address habeas petitions
while other civil motions that might be reportable remain
pending on their dockets.
Concededly, the public may not notice the inclusion of
habeas motions on judges' six-month reporting lists, 199 even
though the reports have recently been made more accessible
than in the past. 200 And there is a reasonable argument that
enhanced public scrutiny of the state of the federal courts'
dockets may, in fact, be undesirable. 201 Nonetheless, including
198. See 28 U.S.C. § 1657; see also supra Part I.C; see also Dungworth & Pace,
supra note 3, at iii (noting that delay in civil cases is not distributed uniformly,
either among classes of litigants or among the various districts in this country).
199. See, e.g., R. Lawrence Dessem, JudicialReporting Under the Civil Justice
Reform Act: Look, Mom, No Cases!, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 687, 698-700 (1993)
(noting that, despite judges' concerns, relatively little media attention has been
paid to the section 476 reports).
200. See Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M. Singer, A Performance Evaluation
Programfor the FederalJudiciary, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 7, 13 n.29 (2009) ("Given
the notion of transparency and accountability inherent in the CJRA, it is ironic
that the Director's semiannual reports are not available to the public on the
official U.S. Courts website."); IAALS STUDY, supra note 3, at 39 n.71 (showing
that while CJRA reports are "available in theory," they are "difficult for the public
to find" and often delayed by up to nine months); Henry, supra note 165, at 864
(encouraging the Administrative Office to make these reports easily available to
the public). The reports have now, however, been made available on the courts'
website. See Judiciary Approves Free Access to Judges' Workload Reports;
Courtroom Sharing for Magistrate Judges, THIRD BRANCH NEWSLETTER (Admin.
Office of the U.S. Courts), Sept. 15, 2009, at 1-2 (stating that all future CJRA
reports will be made available to the public without charge on the judiciary's
public website beginning with the period ending March 31, 2010).
201. Some commentators have noted the tension between accountability and
judicial independence. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REV. 431,
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habeas applications in the publication requirement would
likely have a beneficial effect, since the audience for the CJRA
semiannual reports is not only the public at large, but also
other judges. 202
Judges, like any other peer group, are influenced by the
behaviors and norms of their colleagues. Since passage of the
CJRA, judges do appear to be sufficiently concerned about their
image that they will go about remedying congested dockets in
order to avoid appearing on the six-month lists. 203 As Judge
James Robertson of the U.S. District Court for the D.C. Circuit
observed recently in the Buffalo Law Review, habeas matters
are routinely allowed to "linger for months, or even years,"
which is in part due to the perverse incentives created by the
CJRA:
Each district judge is required to report semiannually his or
her 'old motions' in civil cases-those that have been
pending undecided for longer than six months. It's a
negative incentive-a shaming device-and it has been
quite effective in getting judges to move their cases along.
Habeas corpus cases and § 2255 applications, however, are
not regarded as 'motions.' They are not reportable, so, if
they are sitting on remote corners of our desks gathering
458 (2004) ("If judges were completely 'accountable' in a political sense, they
would become passive tools of the popular will."). And there may be unpalatable
results to enhancing judicial accountability to the public. See David A. Hoffman et
al., Docketology, District Courts and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 706 n.122
(2007) (noting several news articles about "dilatory judges"). For example, the
public may not understand the docket reports because judges with heavier
caseloads (or those who are willing to take on time-consuming multidistrict
litigation) may appear to be delinquent when in fact they are providing
extraordinary help to their colleagues. Judicial backlogs, in addition, may be an
unreliable indicator of judicial quality. See Miller, supra at 475 ("Judges whose
principal concern is to clear cases off their desk may have excellent records for
timeliness but still be bad judges because they do not give sufficient attention to
decisions.").
202. See Henry, supra note 165, at 862-63 ("Judges themselves believe that
the reporting requirements will improve performances by stimulating peer
pressure."); Hoffman et al., supra note 201, at 705-06 ("[S]cholars have been
insufficiently attendant to the shaming sanctions that judges face if they fall too
far behind on their docket. In essence, Congress (through the Administrative
Office) publishes a list naming judges whose dockets are too full. Such dilatory
judges face the gentle ribbing of their fellows at the judicial lunch table and the
harsh glare of the media spotlight."); see also PETER G. FISH, THE POLITICS OF
FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 39 (1973) (discussing the origins of the
Judicial Conference and noting Chief Justice Taft's "confidence" that publicizing
the state of the courts' dockets would promote efficiency through "peer-group
influence").
203. See, e.g., supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
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dust, there is no public accountability. Transparency does
wonders. 204
As Judge Robertson suggests, inclusion of habeas petitions
on the CJRA six-month motions list would cultivate an attitude
of efficiency and a legal culture where the judges would care
about habeas delay. 205 In addition, to the extent the public is
paying attention, inclusion of habeas petitions in the section
476 reports would enhance public confidence in the fair
administration of justice in the courts. 206 Because the Judicial
Conference does not require that habeas petitions be included
on the six-month list, however, the self-policing effects of the
reporting requirement in the habeas context have been lost.
Other considerations also suggest the wisdom of adding
habeas applications to the definition of "motions" for the
reporting requirements of the CJRA. Expanding the reporting
requirement presents no separation of powers issues, unlike
proposed legislation that would set firm time limits on judges
to decide habeas matters. 207 Adding habeas to the reporting
requirement will not force judges to do anything. Judges may
continue to allow habeas applications to sit undecided for six
months, a year, two years, or more, without being required to
turn to those matters before others deemed more pressing. 208
While allowing old habeas motions to sit on the docket may
prove embarrassing when the semiannual reports are issued, it
is difficult to see how judicial independence would be chilled by
204. James Robertson, Quo Vadis, Habeas Corpus?, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1063,
1083 (2008).
205. See IAALS STUDY, supra note 3, at 8-9.
206. Federal judges who have commented on section 476 uniformly embrace it.
See, e.g., Avern Cohn, Advice to the Commission-A Sentencer's View, 8 FED.
SENT'G REP. 14, 14 (1995) (recommending expansion of public reporting of "judge
identifier data" about sentencing decisions, and noting that "[e]xperience under
the Civil Justice Reform Act using judge identifiers in connection with cases
pending more than three years, bench trials undecided, and motions pending
more than six months, has resulted in substantial improvement in shortening the
time that judges take to dispose of motions and cases").
207. See H.R. 3035, 109th Cong. § 8(a) (2005) (requiring Courts of Appeal to
decide the appeal from an order granting or denying a habeas writ "not later than
300 days" after briefing is completed).
208. Modifications for reporting on habeas matters might nonetheless be
appropriate. The Judicial Conference has instructed courts that the "pending"
clock for civil motions will not begin running until "30 days after the motion is
filed," see JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 57 (1999),

but for social security cases, the clock does not begin to run until 120 days after
the filing of the transcript, see id. at 58.
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expanding the reporting requirement. To the extent judges are
concerned that the public or their peers will draw unfair
conclusions from their inclusion on the list, they may submit
explanations for the number of undecided habeas petitions they
have been forced to report. 209
Indeed, this proposal is decidedly less intrusive than other
measures that, at least in theory, might be available to habeas
petitioners whose applications have been sitting unresolved for
lengthy periods of time-including mandamus, impeachment,
and civil liability. 210 In contrast, the reporting requirement is
precisely the kind of self-executing, "informal" method for
resolving delay that seems most likely to be effective in
actually reducing systemic delay. 211 In the last analysis, judges
may still handle their dockets in any way they like, but their
failure to speedily resolve habeas petitions-along with any
explanations for the delay-will at least be transparent to the
public and their colleagues. 2 12
Including habeas petitions in the section 476 reports would
not require new administrative costs, since identical reports
are already required for all other civil matters. Still, it cannot
be said that this proposal would promote efficiency entirely
without costs. Judges have only a limited amount of time to
spend on resolving motions and cases on their dockets, so time
devoted to one set of cases will, absent increased efficiency,
require other matters to remain unresolved for longer. Just as
the Speedy Trial Act requires district court judges to put
criminal matters at the front of their dockets, thereby
necessarily adding some degree of delay to their civil
dockets, 213 any procedural device that encourages the speedier
209. See Dessem, supra note 199, at 697-98 (giving examples of circuits that
include explanatory notes with their section 476 reports).
210. Miller, supra note 201, at 458-64; see also RUSSELL R. WHEELER & A. LEO
LEVIN, JUDIcIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL IN THE UNITED STATES 7-9 (1979)
(discussing the formal mechanisms used to regulate judicial conduct); Charles
Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods of JudicialDiscipline, 142 U. PENN. L. REV. 243,
248-59 (1993) (discussing the Judicial Conduct and Disabilities Act).
211. Charles Gardner Geyh has suggested that formal disciplinary procedures,
like those authorized by the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act of 1980, are ill-suited to address the problem of docket delay. See
Geyh, supra note 210, at 261. Instead, "informal actions by the chief circuit and
district judges appear to be used with the most frequency and to the greatest
effect." Id. at 276.
212. Cf. Irving R. Kaufman, Chilling JudicialIndependence, 88 YALE L.J. 681,
682-83 (1979) (arguing against formal regulation of the judiciary).
213. See, e.g., J. Clifford Wallace, Judicial Administration in a System of
Independents:A Tribe with Only Chiefs, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 39, 51 (noting that
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resolution of habeas matters will, presumably, mean that other
civil matters get resolved less expeditiously.
Of course, as was demonstrated above in Part I, moving
habeas petitions through the courts promptly is precisely the
result that our federal habeas statute, habeas rules, and case
law all seem to envision. That said, the proposal to include
habeas petitions in the CJRA six-month reports does not, in
itself, privilege habeas petitions over other civil motions.
Rather, it does no more than level the playing field so that
judges are not discouraged from addressing habeas petitions
while other civil motions remain pending. In the last analysis,
all that this proposal calls for is fair treatment of habeas
petitions. 214
None of the foregoing observations or recommendations
should be construed as denigrating the work ethic of federal
district court judges. Their workloads are tremendous, and
their dedication to the "just, speedy, and inexpensive" 215
resolution of motions is beyond dispute. But incentives matter,
and habeas petitioners should not be made to bear a
disproportionate share of the burden, in the form of delay in
the resolution of their habeas petitions, caused by the district
courts' heavy caseloads.
CONCLUSION

Speedy judicial attention to a prisoner's claim of illegal
detention must be, and has always been, central to the function
of the writ of habeas corpus. As this empirical study has
shown, however, since the passage of AEDPA, the federal
courts have not kept current with their habeas dockets, instead
the Speedy Trial Act, "while not directly increasing the judiciary's workload per
se, will cause immense problems of caseload management because it severely
compresses the disposition time permitted in criminal cases").
214. Adoption of this proposal would not preclude the courts' adoption of other
measures that would speed the resolution of habeas cases. Judge Weinstein, for
example, has suggested a number of reforms, with the goal of closing each stateprisoner habeas case within 100 days of filing. See WEINSTEIN REPORT, supra note
16, at 17. Among his proposals are (1) that each court's Clerk's Office designate a
staff member to assure that habeas files (including state court hearing
transcripts, briefing, and decisions) are gathered promptly; (2) that adjournment
requests be denied except in extraordinary circumstances; (3) that the practice of
assigning petitions to magistrates be abandoned, unless magistrates' reports are
treated as binding; and (4) that Chief District Court Judges take a more active
role in reassigning habeas cases that have been pending overlong. Id. at 16-25.
215.

FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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allowing an increasing number of petitions to remain
undecided for extraordinary lengths of time. Although, by
statute and court rules, judges should be moving habeas
petitions to the front of their dockets, they have been
discouraged from doing so by the Judicial Conference's
exclusion of habeas petitions from the reporting requirements
of the CJRA. The Judicial Conference should reconsider its
interpretation of the CJRA's reporting provision so that habeas
petitioners do not bear a disproportionate share of the burden
of delay caused by the courts' heavy civil caseload.
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